[Draft] Argument Against Reductive Materialism
Argument Against Reductive Materialism
Lexicon
- Mx = mental property
- Px = physical property
- Rp = reduce to physical
- Rm = reductive materialism
Definitions
- Idealism: theory holding that the self can know nothing but its own modifications and that the self is the only existent thing
- Property: a quality or trait belonging and especially peculiar to an individual or thing
- Mental: Of or relating to the mind.
- Physical: Of or relating to the body
Pr1. Mental properties are different than physical properties
Mx ≠ Px
Pr2. If mental properties are different than physical properties then mental properties are unable to be reduced to physical properties
(Mx ≠ Px) ⊃ ¬(Mx Rp)
Pr3. If mental properties are unable to be reduced to physical properties then reductive materialism is false
¬(Mx Rp) ⊃ ¬Rm
C. Therefore, reductive materialism is false
∴ ¬ Rm
Justification for believing Pr1 to be plausible (if not true)
Ax1. Idealism is possible
Ax2. In an Idealist world only mental properties are adhered by an object
Ax3. It is impossible for physical properties to be adhered by an object in an Idealist world
Ax4. There is at least one mental property that allows adherence in a Idealist world
Ax 5. This property is not reducible to a physical property
C. At least one mental property is different than a physical property
The key to accepting this as a reasonable justification for accepting Pr1 is if the statement "Idealism is true" really is a genuine possibility (can actually be exemplified in some possible world). I believe that we can construct and argument as to why Ax1 is true.
Justification for Ax1
Th1. Something is logically possible iff it is capable of being described without contradiction
Th2. Idealism can be described without contradiction
C. Idealism is logically possible
In light of all of this I believe we have good reasons to think that the conclusion reached by our main argument is true, and that any reductionist program will never be successful in "demythologizing persons". It is important to note that it is still possible to be a Materialist and accept the conclusion of my argument. One simply has to make the jump from being a reductionist to being a non-reductionist, which is also known as "Property Dualism" (that there is one substance, matter, in which two types of properties (mental and physical) adhere in certain objects (namely brains)). At the moment this is just a draft that I am submitting to gather criticism and see what areas it would be important to address later on. Thanks and God bless!
Major Edits
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Altered Solipsism to Idealism
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Will add a section for responses to objections and my view on why property dualism is not a solution to the dilemma of non-reducible mental properties
Significant Contributors
I have been doing some personal study and have found this argument to be severely defective. I will rewrite this article when I get back from vacation and add to the list of contributors that offered the best critiques. I appreciate the effort from those willing to offer thoughtful objections. This will be deleted and a new one will be posted by the same name.
Posted Aug 6, 2013, 11:39 PM UTC · edited