**By Aleks Szczerbiak**

Although not involved in day-to-day governance, Poland’s new right-wing president will destabilise, and act as the centre of resistance to, the liberal-centrist coalition government, severely complicating its institutional and legislative reform programme.

He could also limit its room for manoeuvre on the international stage and help to shake up Poland’s EU trajectory and transatlantic ties.

# De-stabilising the Tusk government

On 6 August, historian Karol Nawrocki was [sworn in as president of Poland](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/08/06/poland-swears-in-new-president-karol-nawrocki/) for a five-year term. Although formally an independent, in the May-June presidential election, Nawrocki was supported openly by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS), Poland’s ruling party between 2015-23 and currently the main opposition grouping. He defeated Warsaw mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, candidate of the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO), the main governing party.



Although the president is not involved in day-to-day governance, it is not simply a ceremonial role and retains important constitutional powers.

These include: the right to initiate legislation, nominate a number of key state officials, refer laws to the Constitutional Tribunal (a powerful body that rules on the constitutionality of Polish legislation) and, perhaps most significantly, a suspensive veto that requires a three-fifths parliamentary majority to overturn.

If a presidential Constitutional Tribunal referral is made under the so-called “preventative control” mode, the legislation only comes into effect after the tribunal’s ruling, which, given that all of its current members were appointed by previous PiS-dominated parliaments, also makes this a de facto veto.

In December 2023, a coalition government headed up by PO leader Donald Tusk took office following eight years of PiS rule. The ruling coalition also includes the agrarian-centrist Polish People’s Party (PSL), liberal-centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) grouping, and the New Left (Nowa Lewica) party

However, the Tusk government has had to “cohabit” with PiS-aligned President Andrzej Duda and lacks the parliamentary majority required to overturn a presidential legislative veto. It now faces continued resistance from a hostile president for the remainder of its term, which is scheduled to run until the next parliamentary elections in autumn 2027.



# Wholesale or strategic opposition?

A Karol Nawrocki presidency will destabilise the ruling coalition and severely complicate its institutional reform and policy agenda.

In particular, the president will continue to act as a major obstacle to the Tusk government’s efforts to unravel its predecessor’s legacy, including attempts to [roll back PiS judicial reforms](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/03/17/polands-ongoing-rule-of-law-crisis-explained/).

Around 2,500 judges appointed by Duda, including the majority of the country’s Supreme Court, were nominated by the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS) after it was overhauled by PiS in 2018 so that most of its members are now chosen by elected bodies such as parliament rather than the legal profession, as was the case previously.

The Tusk government does not recognise these appointments, referring to them disparagingly as “neo-judges”, but, like Duda, the new president will block any reforms that he feels undermine their legitimacy.



Another area where the government could face presidential resistance is on moral-cultural issues, including attempts to [liberalise Poland’s restrictive abortion law](https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/08/26/tusk-admits-polish-abortion-law-liberalisation-unlikely-this-parliamentary-term/) and [introduce state-recognised same-sex civil partnerships](https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/10/19/polish-government-presents-bill-introducing-same-sex-partnerships/).

For sure, the main reason the government has not passed any legislation on these issues has been opposition from PSL, the most conservative element of the ruling coalition. Nonetheless, Nawrocki has made it clear that, even in the unlikely event that the government is able to construct parliamentary majorities to introduce these reforms, it can expect continued resistance from him.

However, it is in both Nawrocki and PiS’s interests for the new president to adopt a nuanced approach and veto legislation, or refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal, selectively and strategically rather than indiscriminately.

Tusk always finds it much easier to operate in a highly polarised political environment and he would no doubt use the wholesale blockage of the government’s legislative agenda to blame its alleged shortcomings on presidential obstruction. This could provide the ruling coalition with a potentially credible, possibly even winning, narrative in the run-up to the next parliamentary elections.

# A more assertive president?

In fact, the presidency carries even more political weight than the Polish constitution might suggest. Perhaps most significantly, the authority that comes from Nawrocki’s huge mandate, in an election that saw the highest ever turnout in a Polish presidential poll, has radically changed the dynamics of political debate.

Nawrocki framed the election as, above all, a [referendum on the Tusk government](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/03/02/president-election-is-referendum-on-tusk-says-opposition-presidential-candidate-nawrocki/), and many Poles certainly used it as an opportunity to channel their discontent with the coalition’s perceived failure to deliver on the policy commitments that helped bring it to power in 2023.

PiS thus sees Nawrocki as playing a key role in weakening – and fuelling public discontent with – the Tusk government. It is hoping this will create the political momentum that will carry the party through to victory at the next (possibly even early) parliamentary elections.



Nawrocki is certainly more combative than his predecessor; during the presidential election campaign, he cultivated a tough-guy image, posting videos of himself at shooting ranges and boxing rings.

For sure, the governing parties portrayed Duda as a “partisan president”, who simply acted as PiS’s “notary”. In many ways, this was not surprising as Duda broadly agreed with much of PiS’s critique of the alleged dysfunctionality of the post-communist state and its core institutions; his disagreements were generally over tactics and the pace of reforms.

However, in practice, Duda has actually blocked relatively few of the Tusk government’s laws (although this was partly because it did not pass some of the most contentious legislation), allowing the vast majority to proceed unhindered. Indeed, with a few minor exceptions, he did not really question the government’s core socio-economic priorities at all.

At the same time, Duda also vetoed a number of key elements of the previous PiS government’s legislative programme, including, for example, the original, more radical iteration of its judicial reforms.

Moreover, on occasions, Duda attempted to build bridges with his political opponents; sometimes [floating the idea of a “coalition of Polish affairs”](https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/07/09/president-proposes-new-coalition-of-polish-interests-from-centre-right-to-far-right-after-election/), an attempt to find common ground among politicians from different ideological backgrounds on key areas of national interest.



Nawrocki, on the other hand, will be much more assertive and is keen to carve out a role as a more independent political actor. Unlike Duda, whose presidency lacked a clear defining concept and strong intellectual and political support base, Nawrocki has surrounded himself with experienced political operators rather than technocrats, who he is hoping can help him to develop and carry forward major independent political initiatives.

A key difference here between Nawrocki and Duda is that, although the new president identifies strongly with PiS, he is less dependent upon the party for his electoral support base.

It was largely PiS voters who secured Duda’s presidential election victories, especially when he was reelected in 2020. Nawrocki’s support was drawn much more from other parties, notably the radical right free-market Confederation (Konfederacja) grouping, whose presidential election candidate Sławomir Mentzen finished a strong third with 15% in the first round of voting.



Indeed, many commentators argue that Nawrocki’s temperament and ideological profile are actually closer to Confederation than PiS. This leaves him well placed to act as a patron of the broad coalition of conservative political forces that is needed for the Polish right to win the next parliamentary elections decisively.

# Influencing foreign policy

Polish foreign policy is determined by the government, so Nawrocki’s impact here is likely to be limited and largely symbolic. However, symbolism matters in politics, and the president does also have some constitutionally mandated foreign policy competencies that could affect the government’s room for manoeuvre on the international stage.

Moreover, the fact that Nawrocki has the authority that stems from a huge electoral mandate means that he can insert himself into and influence political debates and, as the president is commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces, this is particularly true in the case of international security policy.

Ambassadorial appointments also have to be approved by the president. Poland does not currently have a full ambassador in Washington because Duda refused to accept the Tusk government’s nominee, PO politician Bogdan Klich, and Nawrocki has made it clear that he will not do so either.



In terms of EU relations, Nawrocki is an anti-federalist and sceptical of deeper European integration and automatic Polish alignment with EU-wide policies which he sees as a threat to Polish sovereignty.

Nawrocki argues that Poland’s interests often clash with the EU political establishment and dominant powers, especially Germany, with whom the Tusk government has been trying to build closer ties. He appears instead to favour building alternative alliances, particularly with other central and eastern European post-communist states, as the most effective way of advancing Poland’s interests within the EU.

Although the Tusk government’s instincts are to align Poland with the EU mainstream on migration and climate policy, it has put these issues on the backburner due to public hostility, and political pressure from Nawrocki could further limit its room for manoeuvre to support the EU’s plans to deepen integration in these areas.



Nawrocki will also prioritise building the closest possible ties with the US, which, like most Poles, he believes is Poland’s only credible military security guarantor, and oppose the development of a European defence identity outside of NATO structures.

The Trump administration [openly supported Nawrocki](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/05/27/trump-security-secretary-noem-endorses-polish-conservative-presidential-candidate-at-cpac-poland/) in the presidential election, including a headline-grabbing [Oval Office meeting](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/05/02/trump-meets-polish-opposition-presidential-candidate-at-white-house/) with the US President himself. They clearly see each other as very close ideological and strategic allies.

Nawrocki supports the broad consensus within Poland on the need to provide continued diplomatic and military aid to Ukraine. However, unlike Duda, for whom championing virtually unconditional support for Ukraine was probably his most important foreign policy legacy, Nawrocki favours a more transactional approach to Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbour and feels that Warsaw needs to be more assertive when their interests diverge.

He has, for example, criticised Ukraine for its lack of cooperation with [exhumations of the remains of Poles killed by Ukrainian nationalists](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/05/07/exhumation-of-polish-wwii-massacre-victims-in-ukraine-uncovers-remains-of-42-people/) during the Second World War, and pledged to protect Polish farmers from what he argues is unfair competition from Ukrainian agricultural goods.



Unlike Duda, the Tusk government and, indeed, its PiS predecessor – who all supported fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership – Nawrocki is much more sceptical about the country’s rapid accession to Western alliances, at least until outstanding bilateral issues with Poland have resolved.

Nawrocki’s critics argue that this is effectively legitimising the Russian war narrative, but his supporters respond that the new president is no Russophile, pointing out that Moscow has issued an arrest warrant against him for ordering the [dismantling of Soviet Red Army monuments](https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/07/23/poland-tears-down-41st-soviet-monument-since-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/) in Poland.

# Shaking up the political scene

The Polish president is not involved in day-to-day governance in either domestic or foreign policy. But his ability to block legislation, together with the authority that comes from a huge electoral mandate and the political dynamics that this can unleash, mean that a Nawrocki presidency could play an extremely significant role in determining how Poland is governed and the shape of its political scene in the coming years.

Nawrocki will destabilise and act as the centre of resistance to the Tusk government, severely complicating its institutional and legislative reform agenda. Not only will he wield considerable influence over security policy, Nawrocki could also limit the government’s room for manoeuvre on the international stage and help to shake up Poland’s EU trajectory and transatlantic ties.

What can Poland expect from a Karol Nawrocki presidency?