The most useful way to assess the best German divisions during World War 2 - the Inner Combat Value
In the autumn of 1943, as the German situation in the East continued to worsen, the OKH introduced a new type of report on how to evaluate the quality of German divisions - "Assessment of the inner combat value of the divisions".
While the weekly and monthly condition reports showed the actual combat value (Kampfwert) of the German divisions on the reporting day, based on their personnel and material condition, the inner combat value (Innere Kampfwert) had a more indirect, deeper and long-term meaning. Thus, it was a more fundamental assesment of the division's value and reliability. Here's the document, from NARA T313 series, Roll 62:
The first paragraph of the document stated:
The longer the war lasts and the more difficult the situation becomes, the more necessary it is for the highest command to have a clear understanding of the combat value of the formations. The decisive factor here is above all the inner combat value of a division. This is determined by the combat morale, hardness, combat experience and level of training of the troops, as well as the steadfastness and skill of the leadership, and is reflected in the confidence that the higher command has in the division.
This assessment was not based on regarding some divisions as elite, but on a constantly updated assessment of demonstrated performance over a long period of time. The rating acquired was never permanent. Here are differences between combat value and inner combat value:
It didn't matter whether it was infantry or panzer division, as the former can belong to Group I, while the latter to Group II. Moreover, the division can have a combat value IV, but it can still belong to Group I. As seen in the image below, about the condition of German divisions at the start of April 1944 in the southern sector of the Eastern Front, there was a great variety:
The assessments were made by army command, to provide army groups and OKH with information on which divisions can be considered as "Krisenfest" (crisis-proof) - those that could continue to fight effectively under greatest strains and despite heavy losses. Their distribution and use were limited to encourage a maximally forthright assessment - for instance, the evaluated divisions were not informed of the assessment, they were not distributed to Army Personnel Office. These assessments had to be submitted on 10 November 1943, start of January, April, July and October 1944.
Some divisions consistently maintained the highest rating over a long period of time, while others were badly degraded over several months. For example, the Grossdeutschland Division always belonged to Group I in the January, April, July and October 1944 reports. Meanwhile, the 16th Panzergrenadier Division belonged to Group I in January 1944, but by the start of April 1944, when its remnants were in the process of being withdrawn from south Ukraine to France for rebuilding, the division was downgraded to Group IV by the 6th Army High Command.
In my opinion, when evaluating the quality of German divisions, these reports are the most useful primary source, which are also not easy to come by. As far as I’m aware, they have not been used in the literature or at least to a very limited extent. In any event, the Inner Combat Value system is much better then to judge divisions on the basis of Knight's Cross holders, mentions in the Wehrmacht communiques, level of supposed eliteness, generalisations, anecdotal evidence or post-war reputation :)
Posted Sep 28, 2025, 1:41 PM UTC