In Indian epistemology/IKS, *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (direct perception) is the strongest and most immediate means of knowledge. When something is directly perceptible, reasoning is unnecessary. One does not *infer* fire when one can *see* fire.

To reason out God’s existence is therefore an implicit admission that God is not available to pratyakṣa. What then remains is *anumana* (inference), systematized most rigorously in Nyaya Darshanas through causal arguments, design, moral order, and necessity of a regulator.

But this move has a philosophical cost.

Nyāya does not *reveal* God; it postulates God as the *best explanatory hypothesis* to solve certain metaphysical problems:

* causation without infinite regress,
* order without chaos,
* moral law without an enforcer.

This is epistemic concession, not epistemic triumph.

Other Hindu darshanas recognize this limitation clearly:

* Sankhya rejects God precisely because He is not pratyakṣa.
* Mimamsa sees no need for God if dharma is self-sufficient.
* Advaita Vedanta treats Brahman as *aparokṣa* (non-objectifiable), knowable only through direct realization, not inference.

Mufti Sahab admitted defeat, but claimed victory (acting all Sikander?). The defeat is the open admission that God cannot be proved by direct evidence, but only indirectly through 'inference'. In IKS, it's like saying no Pratyaksha Pramana possible, only Nyaya Darshana suitable.