Non-chancy L-free choices

(1) If libertarianism is true then, for some actual choice-making situation where S has reasons R at t_e which make choosing in more than one way minimally sensible from his POV, and chooses to A a moment later at t, (i) the perceived (from S's POV) rationalizing force of R w.r.t. S's options is roughly reflected in their causal influence on his choice to A and (ii) it isn't a matter of chance that S chooses to A.

(2) If the perceived rationalizing force of R is roughly reflected in their causal influence on S's choice to A then at t_e there's a non-trivial objective chance that S will choose to A and non-trivial objective chance that S won't choose to A.

(3) If, at t_e, there's a non-trivial objective chance that S will choose to A and there's a non-trivial objective chance that S will not choose to A, then it's a matter of chance that S chooses to A at t.

(4) The perceived rationalizing force of R is roughly reflected in their causal influence on S's choice to A.

(5) Libertarianism is false. (1,2,3,4)