I'd like to mention something I have encountered a few times in this sub regarding the crew survivability difference between NATO-Warsaw Pact, I know for most people it will sound like saying "water is wet" but I see people mention it time to time so I wanted to write a few stuff about it:

It was and is not about retaining manpower or experience, it was about mobility in terms of the single tank itself and operational tempo

A crew of 3–4 men trained for a few months — up to a year if resources and time allow — is relatively inexpensive compared to the level of attrition seen in high-intensity warfare. Training armored crews today is generally faster and more cost-efficient than during the Cold War due to simulators, standardized procedures, and improved logistics. And even during Cold War loosing men that has been trained a few months was acceptable since they even were expecting to loose huge amount of officers/nco

During the Cold War, planners on both sides expected extremely heavy losses if a full war started. Tanks were not designed to be survivable. The goal was simpler: keep the vehicle moving if possible, or at least keep it recoverable or at least make it stay in the fight. If a tank could drive away, be towed by an armored recovery vehicle, or be picked up after the battle with its hull intact, it still had value.

Soviet-designed tanks as you all know and saw had the structural vulnerability ammunition stored in carousel autoloaders beneath the turret ring increased the risk (not always) that a penetrating hit resulting tank turret and crew becoming a part of low orbital space force of USSR. When this occurred it made recovery or cannibalization (if this is a word) impossible and leaving the vehicle effectively as a total loss.

If the hull survives, however, components can be cannibalized or replaced — engines, guns, optics, or even entire turrets can be replaced. In the current war in Ukraine, many Soviet-origin tanks are repaired or stripped for parts. 

Today this receives limited mainstream visibility because battlefield recovery and depot-level refurbishment are less visually dramatic than catastrophic losses (sometimes these losses are not even losses since you dont get the post hit footage). And other part is of course how deadly the grey zone has become for any vehicle/personel, you simply cannot recover without loosing more vehicle because how wide the zone is (around 35km depending on many factors) because of drones. Around 22-23 we used to see a lot more such footage of recovery but because of drones when things go wrong for a vehicle it goes way more wrong compared to a few years ago

As for crew survivability, it is important to understand how it was viewed in doctrine. Lives were often treated as numbers inside planning models. Both sides ran calculations about acceptable losses, replacement rates, and operational tempo. A surviving crew mattered because it preserved combat power, not primarily because of long-term experience retention or moral considerations. A crew that survived could man another tank. A tank that survived could be repaired and reused.

Even the concept of “reliability” was calculated differently. Western doctrine often emphasized durability, crew protection, and longer vehicle lifespan, fewer losses, but higher unit cost. Soviet doctrine accepted higher expected losses because they could sustain those high losses compared to NATO and relied on simpler and lighter designs, mass production, and the assumption that large numbers would offset destruction or would worth the cost that will be paid in strategic terms. Both approaches were statistical in nature. Human lives, vehicle lifespan, and logistical sustainability were variables in planning equations.

Regarding the crew survivability