Is LFW (Libertarian Free Will) always defined as: When you make a free choice, you could have done differently under the exact same prior conditions?

Given the (LFW) definition of free will:

• When you make a free choice, you could have done differently under the exact same prior conditions.
• Determinism is necessarily false (with respect to human choices).

If you personally believe in Libertarian Free Will, does that definition resonate?

If your interpretation is that of Event-Causal Libertarianism (choices have influences/causes, but are not deterministically fixed), how do you respond to the common criticism that if indeterminism/stochasticity is a factor decisions are random? (Incompatible with moral responsibility).

If your interpration is religious or non-causal (spontaneous agency/super natural/their own kind of 'force'), how do you respond to the common criticism of occam's razor (the explanation required additional entities therefore less plausible).

Come fight me (with civility) 🧤.