[EVENT] Suez Retribution Act

Suez Retribution Act
August - December 1962
The governing coalition between the Young Egypt party and the Wafd had been shaky to say the least. Conflicting economic visions and disagreements over foreign policy had provided significant instability to the coalition, which had at points been increasingly close to breaking over the previous months. Military pressure, however, had held the coalition together for now. An uneasy compromise had been reached. The Young Egypt party had for now moderated its economic demands in exchange for their leader, Anwar Sadat, being granted the position of foreign minister, a role he intended to use to force a harsher stance against the United Kingdom and the Zionist entity. 

Believing that openly provoking Britain would harm Egypt’s international reputation and increase the threat of further military intervention by a resurgent British imperialism, the Wafd had been obstructing him at every opportunity. The Wafd deputy foreign minister had been ensuring Sadat was kept in check. This did not, however, prevent Sadat from making fiery, provocative speeches to growing crowds of Young Egypt supporters in Cairo accusing the Wafd of weakness in the face of British exploitation, and in some cases of being in league with London - noting the party’s collaboration with Britain in 1942. Suggestions that Egypt would pay for ownership of the Suez Canal Company, buying it out from its investors, out of pocket only served to enrage Sadat, not to mention the many thousands of Young Egyptians across Egypt. London had also demanded that any reparations it offered to Egypt not be used to buyout the company, a demand to which the Wafd complied. To Sadat, this was only a further example of the liberal government’s weakness.

One of Sadat’s demands that the Wafd had acquiesced to earlier in the year was to place an embargo on all British goods entering Egypt. In truth, the proposal had been watered down significantly from an immediate embargo to one that would only come into effect should Britain fail to pay the reparations that Egypt was entitled to under the ICJ ruling. Even then, the Wafd had been delaying the passing of the bill in the Assembly, using whatever procedural methods necessary to prevent the bill passing.  

This changed in November 1962. As the foreign ministry attempted to reach out to British representatives to inquire as to when Egypt could expect reparation payments to begin, it soon became clear that London had no intention to fulfill its obligations. The British representatives would cite procedural delays but promised to get round to it “at some point”, a response most insufficient to the government. Needless to say, this was humiliating for the Wafd, who had until now been heavily playing up the success of negotiation and failures of military force demonstrated by the Suez crisis. This development sent a wrecking ball to that narrative, Egypt was not being respected and had not brought about concessions from the British.

Word of this was leaked to the Egyptian press, no doubt by Young Egypt or even, as rumours suggested, Sadat himself who had access to all the details as foreign minister. Demonstrations organised by Young Egypt became even more frequent. Leveraging his growing support amongst the Egyptian population, Sadat made a move. He threatened to immediately withdraw from the governing coalition if his embargo bill was not passed, a move which would have triggered fresh elections. Fearing the rising support for Sadat in the streets, the Wafd relented to his demands, not before attempting another compromise. Sadat, however, was done compromising. 

Thus, in December the embargo bill finally passed the Assembly, establishing a total import ban on all British goods entering Egypt, likewise a similar export ban. Sadat hailed this as a great victory for Young Egypt and for the Egyptian people. Nationalists celebrated while business leaders feared the effect of trade disruption on their profits. Inside the Wafd, concern was growing over Sadat’s increasing popularity amongst the Egyptian people. Efforts would have to be made to curb his growth, something that had already proven difficult in the past. Perhaps, increasingly illiberal practices would have to be resorted to, paradoxically to save Egyptian democracy.