Legislator-to-Citizen Ratio

Legislator-to-Citizen Ratio

The legislator-to-citizen ratio is an important political matter often overlooked. A state can have democratic elections, but if its legislator-to-citizen ratio is wildly imbalanced, it may behave like an oligarchy. The reason for this is simple: the average citizen is not wealthy or connected enough to reach out to a very large number of voters. A citizen of moderate wealth has a more realistic chance of reaching out to 30,000 voters than 300,000 voters. Therefore, as a general rule, the fewer seats a legislature has relative to the number of citizens, the more that legislature's interests will align with the upper class.

Reform

I propose that 1 legislator never stand for more than 30,000 citizens, even if preserving this ratio requires a state to break up into smaller states.

☙ 1 ❧

... make the deputies so numerous, that there may be no possibility of corrupting the majority...

—John Trenchard (Cato's Letters, Number 60)

☙ 2 ❧

We are duped by the forms of liberty. A representation so partial as to be almost a mockery and so venal as to be little better than a nusance bears the name of a real representation.

—Richard Price (a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 1789/08/03)
[Parliament lacks proper representation.]

☙ 3 ❧

One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very inadequate representation...

—Mercy Otis Warren (Observations on The New Constitution, 1788)
[Congress will be too oligarchical.]

☙ 4 ❧

Why was it not clearly and unequivocally expressed, that they should be entitled, to have one for every 30,000? This would have obviated all disputes; and was this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and a state shall send Representatives in this proportion, Congress may remand them, because the right of having one for every 30,000 is not clearly expressed: this possibility of reducing the number to one for each state approximates to probability by that other expression, "but each state shall at least have one Representative." Now, is it not clear that, from the first expression, the number might be reduced so much that some States should have no Representatives at all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression?

—Patrick Henry (a speech, 1788/06/05)
[The Constitution does not guarantee a 1-30,000 ratio.]

☙ 5 ❧

... in what terms, reconcileable to majesty, and at the same time to truth, shall we speak of a late instruction to his majesty's governor of the colony of Virginia, by which he is forbidden to assent to any law for the division of a county, unless the new county will consent to have no representative in assembly? ... is it rather meant to confine the legislative body to their present numbers, that they may be the cheaper bargain whenever they shall become worth a purchase.

—Thomas Jefferson (A Summary View of the Rights of British America)
[Beware of small legislatures.]

☙ 6 ❧

There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people... it is difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the welfare of the people.

—Agrippa (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[1-30,000 is not a good enough ratio for proper representation.]

☙ 7 ❧

Under the pretence of different branches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the same general description of citizens.

—Agrippa (tenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Both houses of Congress will be aristocratic.]

☙ 8 ❧

The confidence which the people have in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing them when they misbehave: but in a republic of the extent of this continent, the people in general would be acquainted with very few of their rulers: the people at large would know little of their proceedings, and it would be extremely difficult to change them.

—Brutus (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Representatives should be close to the people and known to them.]

☙ 9 ❧

It is obvious, that for an assembly to be a true likeness of the people of any country, they must be considerably numerous... in reality there will be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic... No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number. The British house of commons consists of five hundred and fifty-eight members; the number of inhabitants in Great-Britain, is computed at eight millions—this gives one member for a little more than fourteen thousand, which exceeds double the proportion this country can ever have: and yet we require a larger representation in proportion to our numbers, than Great-Britain, because this country is much more extensive, and differs more in its productions, interests, manners, and habits. The democratic branch of the legislatures of the several states in the union consists, I believe at present, of near two thousand; and this number was not thought too large for the security of liberty by the framers of our state constitutions: some of the states may have erred in this respect, but the difference between two thousand, and sixty-five, is so very great, that it will bear no comparison.

—Brutus (third paper Anti-Federalist papers)
[Congress has too few seats.]

☙ 10 ❧

The great art, therefore, in forming a good constitution, appears to be this, so to frame it, as that those to whom the power is committed shall be subject to the same feelings, and aim at the same objects as the people do, who transfer to them their authority. There is no possible way to effect this but by an equal, full and fair representation... However fair an appearance any government may make, though it may possess a thousand plausible articles and be decorated with ever so many ornaments, yet if it is deficient in this essential principle of a full and just representation of the people... it still will be a government, not according to the will of the people, but according to the will of a few.

—Brutus (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Without proper representation a state cannot be a republic.]

☙ 11 ❧

... the number of senators and representatives proposed for this vast continent, does not equal those of your own state; how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in the United States... Another thing may be suggested against the small number of representatives is, that but few of you will have the chance of sharing even in this branch of the legislature; and that the choice will be confined to a very few...

—Cato (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[America is too big to have so few legislators.]

☙ 12 ❧

The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers...

—Centinel (first paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[There will not be enough representation in the House of Representatives.]

☙ 13 ❧

Have you a right to send more than one for every thirty thousand of you? Can he be presumed knowing to your different, peculiar situations—your abilities to pay public taxes, when they ought to be abated, and when increased? Or is there any possibility of giving him information? All these questions must be answered in the negative... In this view of the System, let me sincerely ask you, where is the people in this House of Representatives?... May they not with propriety be termed an Assistant Aristocratical Branch, who will be infinitely more inclined to co-operate and compromise with each other, than to be the careful guardians of the rights of their constituents?

—John DeWitt (third paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[1-30,000 is not a good enough ratio for proper representation.]

☙ 14 ❧

... this federal representative branch will have but very little democracy in it...

—Federal Farmer (third paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[There will not be enough democracy in the House of Representatives.]

☙ 15 ❧

But when power is once transferred from the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the government, in this case. being beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions and severe struggles on the part of the common people. Every man of reflection must see, that the change now proposed, is a transfer of power from the many to the few, and the probability is, the artful and ever active aristocracy, will prevent all peaceable measures for changes, unless when they shall discover some favourable moment to increase their own influence.

—Federal Farmer (fourth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[The United States might become an oligarchy.]

☙ 16 ❧

Dear Sir, Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators, and many magistrates, we see all important powers collecting in one centre, where a few men will possess them almost at discretion.

—Federal Farmer (fifth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[The federal government will be an oligarchy.]

☙ 17 ❧

... where there is but one representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he can only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents, even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between the representatives and the people in general represented.

—Federal Farmer (seventh paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Even a ratio of 1-15,000 may be too few for proper representation.]

☙ 18 ❧

... equal liberty prevails in England, because there was a representation of the people, in fact and reality, to establish it; equal liberty never prevailed in Rome, because there was but the shadow of a representation.

—Federal Farmer (eighth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)

☙ 19 ❧

Surely we never can be so unwise as to sacrifice, essentially, the all-important principles of representation for so small a sum as 21,600 dollars a year... we expend three times this sum every year upon useless inferior offices and very triffling concerns.

—Federal Farmer (ninth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Paying to have many representatives is worth the cost.]

☙ 20 ❧

By increasing the representation we make it more difficult to corrupt and influence the members; we diffuse them more extensively among the body of the people, perfect the balance, multiply information, strengthen the confidence of the people, and consequently support the laws on equal and free principles.

—Federal Farmer (ninth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[More seats in a legislature generally means less corruption.]

☙ 21 ❧

To palliate for the smallness of the representation, it is observed, that the state governments in which the people are fully represented, necessarily form a part of the system. ... the state governments then we are told will stand between the arbitrary exercise of power and the people: true they may, but armless and helpless, perhaps, with the privilege of making a noise when hurt—this is no more than individuals may do. Does the constitution provide a single check for a single measure, by which the state governments can constitutionally and regularly check the arbitrary measures of congress?

—Federal Farmer (tenth paper, Anti-Federalist papers)
[The state legislators will not make Congress more representative.]

☙ 22 ❧

It has been said that the representation in the general legislature is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the intention of representation.

—A Plebian (Evils Under Confederation Exaggerated..., Anti-Federalist papers)

☙ 23 ❧

For if the representation, stipulated by the constitution, framed by the late convention, be attentively and dispassionately considered, it must be obvious to every disinterested observer, that the number is not, by any means, adequate to the present inhabitants of this extensive continent, much less to those it will contain at a future period.

—An Observer (Scotland and England—A Case in Point, 1787/12/3, Anti-Federalist papers)

☙ 24 ❧

We the Aristocratic party of the United States... we have thought meet to indulge them in something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to elect their representatives annually... We have taken away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us—that grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they would have come charged on re-election.

—Montezuma (A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny, Anti-Federalist papers)
[Montezuma mocks the Federalists.]

☙ 25 ❧

... the Convention do in the Name and Behalf of the People of the State of New York enjoin it upon their Representatives... to Obtain a Ratification of the following Amendments to the said Constitution... That there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand Inhabitants...

—New York (Ratification Statement to the United States Constitution)

☙ 26 ❧

In the elections to Cromwell's Parliaments the rotten boroughs had been abolished as being under the influence of the local gentry, and the county representation had been proportionately increased. But the old constituencies had been restored with Charles II, and the men of 1689 left the unreformed representation to grow ever more corrupt with years, bringing thereby many evils on the country, possibly among others the quarrel with America.

—George Macaulay Trevelyan (The History of England, Book 5, Introduction)
[Beware of legislatures becoming less representative over time.]