I found this ontological argument, does it work? If not, where exactly does it fail?

So this is the argument:

P1 If Informational Structural Realist Model of Meta Ontology is true, then that which conceptual or semantic conditions necessarily exist

P2 Informational structural realist model of Meta ontology is true

C1 That which conceptual/semantic conditions necessarily exist

P3 For anything with semantic/conceptual conditions, it exists either as just a mere concept or as something more than just a mere concept (it has an extramental instantiation, which is to say it is mind independent)

P4 God has semantic/conceptual conditions

C2 God exists either as a mere concept or as something more than just a mere concept, i.e., something mind independent

P5 God either exists as a mere concept or something more than just a mere concept, i.e., as a mind independent object (follows from C2)

P6 It is logically impossible and thus necessarily false that God exists as a mere concept

C3 God exists in a way that isn’t just a mere concept, and thus as a mind independent object; ergo, God exists objectively.

Apparently the way p6 is justified ist by defining God as "maximally causal" and claiming that, if God was a concept/mind-dependent, God would be caused by the thought/mind and could thus not be maximally causal.

I'm not very well-versed in logic, so I was wondering where (if at all) the flaws of this argument are.

source: @ / Apollo_tka on yt