The Economist has previously written about the US-Israeli relationship during the strike campaign against Iran, looking at the possibility of divergent political aims between the US and Israel. Now, Netanyahu faces the possibility that he becomes a scapegoat, as the US seeks to disengage.

‘His \[Netanyahu\] partner, America’s president, is now dealing with Iran’s leaders directly. Israel was aware that talks were going on but was not a party to them. Until Mr Trump updated Mr Netanyahu shortly before his announcement of the ceasefire, the Israeli air force was preparing to send its warplanes to attack Iran’s energy infrastructure, helping to carry out the American president’s threat to destroy Iran’s “whole civilisation”. Instead, the pilots were stood down…

Worse still for Mr Netanyahu, he could yet be transformed from partner to scapegoat. He convinced Mr Trump to launch their war on February 28th with the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and of dozens of other senior regime figures. On April 7th the New York Times quoted senior American officials, including the vice-president, secretary of state and head of the cia, the spy agency, who expressed their reservations about Mr Netanyahu’s plans before the war. Such leaks, as the war may be ending, could be a sign that many in Mr Trump’s administration now want to distance themselves from Israel’s leader. They are acutely aware that Israel has become deeply unpopular among American voters. A survey conducted in late March by Pew, a research outfit, found that 60% of Americans now have an unfavourable view of Israel, a rise of seven percentage points from last year. Mr Trump personally still seems closely aligned with the prime minister, but their partnership could well be tested.’

Partner, scapegoat or spoiler? Israel’s place in a fragile ceasefire