In June 2026, NFL front offices are actively debating trade rumors surrounding Cleveland Browns sophomore quarterback Shedeur Sanders. Reports from ESPN Cleveland's Tony Rizzo indicate that several teams, including the New Orleans Saints and the Indianapolis Colts, have contacted general manager Andrew Berry to gauge Sanders' availability. Some league insiders suggest that the Browns will trade Sanders if veteran Deshaun Watson secures the starting job during training camp.

However, when you analyze the data, trading Sanders for day-three draft capital represents a costly mistake in asset management. Sanders went 3-4 as a starter late in the 2025 season and stabilized a struggling offense. Meanwhile, the other Cleveland quarterbacks combined for a poor 2-8 record over the remaining games. This performance gap proves that Sanders offers vital competence and stability. Discarding him to favor Watson ignores the clear statistical reality and exposes the franchise to severe transition risk.

# Passing Efficiency Numbers

To evaluate both players fairly, you must analyze their passing efficiency metrics side by side. Table 1 presents Expected Points Added (EPA) per play, success rate, and air yards per attempt for Deshaun Watson's 2024 season and Shedeur Sanders' 2025 performance.

|**Metric**|**Deshaun Watson (2024 Season)**|**Shedeur Sanders (2025 Season)**|
|:-|:-|:-|
|Expected Points Added per Play|\-0.23|\-0.23|
|Success Rate (%)|34.29%|36.72%|
|Air Yards per Pass Attempt|7.52|7.82|

Expected Points Added (EPA) measures how much a quarterback's decisions improve his team's scoring probability on each play. Both Watson in 2024 and Sanders in 2025 finished with an identical -0.23 EPA per play. While these numbers seem low, you must evaluate the context of the supporting rosters.

Watson played with a healthy offensive line early in 2024. Yet, he consistently failed to generate drives or convert third downs, posting just a 24.0% dropback success rate on third downs. In contrast, Sanders played behind a banged-up offensive line that lost nearly every Week 1 starter. Despite this extreme obstacle, Sanders generated a superior overall success rate of 36.72%. Success rate measures the percentage of plays that gain positive expected points, meaning Sanders kept the offense on schedule far more effectively than Watson.

Furthermore, Sanders pushed the ball downfield with greater confidence. He averaged 7.82 air yards per pass attempt, while Watson averaged 7.52 air yards. This vertical aggression completely transformed the spacing of the Browns offense. Under Watson, defenses compressed the field because they did not fear his deep accuracy. Watson's presence actively destroyed the value of surrounding receivers. For example, wide receiver Jerry Jeudy gained only 266 receiving yards during his first seven games with Watson in 2024. Once Watson left the lineup, Jeudy exploded for 963 receiving yards over the final eleven weeks. Sanders leveraged this vertical space in 2025, completing explosive passes that opened up the entire offense for rookie running back Quinshon Judkins and standout rookie tight end Harold Fannin Jr.

When you analyze passing space, you see how Sanders' willingness to push the ball downfield altered defensive alignments. Sanders' deep-ball accuracy to Cedric Tillman on deep dig routes off play-action demonstrates his excellent awareness of the field. Todd Monken's system uses quick screen pass designs, such as Sanders' 66-yard screen touchdown to Dylan Sampson in Week 12, to counter any arm strength limitations. This contrasts with Watson's inability to execute basic screens or play on schedule. During a historically bad stretch in 2024, the Browns went 0-for-26 on third downs under Watson's direction. Watson routinely threw the ball into the dirt and failed to give his playmakers any chance to run after the catch. Sanders' presence gave the entire unit a baseline level of competence, whereas Watson's presence caused immediate offensive collapses.

# Managing Pressure and Sacks

A quarterback's pocket management directly determines his team's offensive floor. Negative plays, such as sacks and fumbles, kill drives and force punts. Table 2 contrasts Watson and Sanders on pressure management and sack mitigation.

|**Metric**|**Deshaun Watson (2024 Season)**|**Shedeur Sanders (2025 Season)**|
|:-|:-|:-|
|Average Time to Throw (Seconds)|2.79|3.07|
|Pressure-to-Sack %|28.0%|17.6%|
|Overall Sack Rate (%)|12.18%|9.09%|

At first glance, you see that Sanders held the ball longer, averaging 3.07 seconds to throw compared to Watson's 2.79 seconds. In the NFL, taking over three seconds to release the ball typically invites heavy pressure. However, the key differentiator remains the pressure-to-sack (P2S) rate. Watson converted 28.0% of his pressured dropbacks into sacks, whereas Sanders converted only 17.6%.

This disparity points to a major issue in Watson's post-snap processing and physical limitations. During his seven starts in 2024, Watson absorbed 33 sacks. He held onto the ball, failed to identify pre-snap blitzes, and drifted directly into the path of pass rushers. Sanders entered the league with serious questions about his sack avoidance after taking 94 sacks during his final two college seasons at Colorado. However, his rookie season showed massive professional growth. Opponents pressured Sanders on 44.1% of his dropbacks in 2025, which ranked as the second-highest rate in the league. Despite this constant duress, he finished with a 9.09% overall sack rate.

Sanders possesses a rare ability to keep his eyes downfield while navigating a muddy pocket. He uses subtle arm angles and slide steps to preserve throwing windows, throwing the ball away when plays break down rather than absorbing drive-ending hits. Watson's inability to handle pressure represents a permanent flaw in his game, which makes him a massive liability behind any offensive line.

The physical breakdown of the offensive line in 2025 highlights the value of Sanders' sack mitigation. Injuries devastated the Browns' front five, leaving left guard Joel Bitonio as the only remaining opening-day starter. Yet, Sanders maintained a tiny 1.3% turnover-worthy play rate under this constant duress. He did not panic when the pocket collapsed. This pocket navigation contrasts with Watson, whose clean-pocket performance ranked 24th in the league in 2024. Watson struggled to operate cleanly even when his blockers provided perfect protection. His poor pocket presence caused him to absorb a league-high 31 sacks over his first six weeks in 2024. While Sanders worked hard with the coaching staff to quicken his release and improve his footwork, Watson resisted coaching adjustments and wanted to play strictly out of shotgun without adapting his dropbacks.

# The Todd Monken Offensive System

The Browns hired head coach Todd Monken to modernize their passing attack. Monken's system emphasizes quick-game concepts from shotgun, vertical passing space, and high-frequency shotgun dropbacks. Table 3 presents the some EPA and passing depth metrics for Watson and Sanders.

|**Metric**|**Deshaun Watson (2024 Season)**|**Shedeur Sanders (2025 Season)**|
|:-|:-|:-|
|Total EPA |\-64.44|\-59.50|
|Pass EPA|\-62.59|\-70.23|
|Rush EPA|\-1.85|10.73|
|Scramble %|8.12%|7.11%|

Expected Points Added measures how much a quarterback's choices help or hurt his team's scoring chances on each play. When you look at the total efficiency numbers, Sanders held a clear advantage. Sanders recorded a Total EPA of -59.50, outperforming Watson's Total EPA of -64.44. While Watson logged a slightly better Pass EPA of -62.59 compared to Sanders' Pass EPA of -70.23, you must consider the context of the protection. Sanders threw his passes under constant duress behind a battered offensive line that lost nearly every opening day starter.

The rushing statistics highlight the biggest schematic difference between both players. Sanders generated a highly productive 10.73 Rush EPA. Watson recorded a negative -1.85 Rush EPA, proving that his athletic ability declined significantly. Monken's system relies on spread concepts that require a quarterback to hurt defenses with his legs when the defense covers downfield options. Sanders delivered this element consistently, whereas Watson failed to escape pressure or gain positive yards.

Finally, the scramble metrics demonstrate Sanders' superior discipline under pressure, but not by much. Watson scrambled on 8.12% of his plays, while Sanders scrambled on 7.11% of his plays. This difference shows that Sanders stayed more committed to the pocket overall but the difference between the two is \~1% and could be more affected by Sanders' slow progressions. The fact remains that Watson is grossly overvalued when compared to his salary.

# Game Theory and Roster Management

From a game theory and roster construction standpoint, the Browns front office must preserve high-value assets. Watson carries a historically disastrous 230 million dollar contract that fully guarantees his salary, crippling the team's financial flexibility. Restructuring this deal has pushed massive cap hits into the current season, which leaves the team with no financial margin for error.

To survive this financial burden, you must roster cheap, highly productive players at premium positions. Sanders provides the ultimate financial offset. He costs the team only 4.6 million dollars total over his four-year rookie contract, which yields a tiny salary cap hit. Keeping a starting-caliber sophomore quarterback on a rookie-scale contract allows the front office to allocate resources to other critical areas of the roster.

Furthermore, the presence of other young quarterbacks on the roster does not justify trading Sanders. The depth chart includes rookie Dillon Gabriel and rookie Taylen Green. While Gabriel has talent, he struggled with injuries and has not shown starting-level consistency in the NFL. Green remains a raw, developmental project whom the Browns selected in the sixth round of the 2026 draft. Neither player provides a reliable safety net if Watson fails. Therefore, their presence on the roster does not give general manager Andrew Berry leverage to discard Sanders.

Finally, trading Sanders for a day-three draft pick represents an unacceptable failure in asset management. Day-three draft selections have a microscopic chance of developing into starting quarterbacks. Sanders has already proven that he can lead this team to wins against professional defenses. He won three starts late in 2025 and demonstrated the precise deep-ball accuracy required to elevate Monken's system. Trading a cost-controlled sophomore quarterback with starting experience for a late-round flyer destroys franchise value.

Watson's contract demands a massive fully guaranteed salary cap hit of nearly 73 million dollars annually. This massive financial burden prevents general manager Andrew Berry from adding high-priced free agents. In contrast, Sanders commands a tiny rookie salary, with an annual cap hit that does not exceed 1.3 million dollars over the next three seasons. This massive discount allows the Browns to afford their newly rebuilt offensive line, which features veterans like Zion Johnson, Elgton Jenkins, and Tytus Howard. If the Browns trade Sanders, they lose their only high-value, cost-controlled asset at the quarterback position.

The presence of Dillon Gabriel and Taylen Green provides merely an illusion of depth. Gabriel's history of concussions and Green's raw developmental profile do not offer starting security. Trading Sanders for a day-three draft selection makes no mathematical sense. A late-round pick has a very low probability of developing into a starting quarterback, whereas Sanders already possesses proven starting ability. Keeping Sanders on the roster costs almost nothing, protects the team from a single point of failure, and preserves a high-value asset for future trades if necessary.

# Conclusion: The Risk for Cleveland

Trading Shedeur Sanders introduces severe transition risks that will ruin the Cleveland Browns' season. Deshaun Watson is 30 years old, recovering from an Achilles tendon that he tore twice, and carrying significant off-field baggage. He has failed to show any consistency or high-level performance over his brief appearances in Cleveland.

If Watson suffers another season-ending injury or continues his massive regression, the Browns will have no viable options at the most important position on the field. Trading Sanders forces the coaching staff to play Dillon Gabriel or Taylen Green before they are ready. This outcome will immediately tank the season, destroy locker room morale, and waste a championship-caliber roster. Keeping Sanders provides the only logical safety net for a franchise tied to a volatile, declining veteran. The analytical data proves that Sanders possesses the efficiency, pressure management, and system fit to lead the Cleveland Browns. Trading him for a late-round draft pick represents an inexcusable error in roster construction.

Data sourced via ESPN, NextGenStats, TruMedia, and SūmerSports

Why Shouldn’t the Browns Trade Shedeur Sanders? Inside the Deshaun Watson Dilemma