Judge Williams Benchslaps Trump and his Lawyers

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/72207870/106/trump-v-internal-revenue-service/

The Parties used the existence of federal litigation as a means of conferring
legitimacy upon a course of action that they were unwilling to subject to judicial review.
The context of the “settlement,” the relationships of the people involved in negotiating and
approving it, the ethical implications of their conduct, and the Parties’ swift efforts to
dismiss this case after the Court raised fundamental jurisdictional questions all support
this conclusion. Accordingly, the Court expressly finds that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith.
See Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 155 F.4th 289, 295 (3d Cir. 2025)
(monetary sanctions were proper under the court’s inherent power where the lawyers
acted in bad faith and committed fraud on the court by using “their clients to bring
contrived lawsuits”). That finding is enough to invoke the Court’s inherent authority. See
JTR Enter., LLC v. Columbian Emeralds, 697 F. App’x 976, 986 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The
key to invoking a court’s inherent power to sanction is a finding of bad faith.”) (citation
omitted).

The Court finds monetary sanctions appropriate under its inherent authority and
prerogative to police the matters and litigants who avail themselves of its jurisdiction. See
Purchasing Power, LLC, 851 F.3d at 1223 (“Courts have the inherent power to police
those appearing before them.”) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46).67 These monetary
sanctions would include the attorneys’ fees incurred by Court-appointed amici in
appearing before the Court and briefing the jurisdictional questions identified by the Court.
See Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1215 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Where, as here, the district
court fashions a sanction which is a direct response to the harm that the bad faith conduct
of the attorney causes, it is clearly acting within its discretion.”).
As one leading treatise has explained:
Ordinarily, an amicus curiae who participates in a proceeding by leave of
court or by court appointment is not entitled to compensation when he or
she serves the interests of litigants, witnesses or any other private party . .
. However, where the court appoints an amicus curiae who renders
services which prove beneficial to a resolution of the questions
presented, the court may properly award compensation and direct it
to be paid by the party responsible for the situation which prompted
the court to make the appointment*.*
4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 12 (emphasis added); see also Morales v. Turman, 820
F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1987) (attorneys’ fees may be awarded to appointed amici if the
amici’s services were highly beneficial and defendants were properly considered the
parties who made the services necessary). Nonetheless, the Court-appointed amici have
declined any reimbursement for their important service to the Court.

There remain the initial amici—whose appearance was not contested by any
Party—and the thirty-five former Federal Judges, whose briefing precipitated this Order.
Accordingly, these amici, if they wish, may file, within fourteen (14) days of this Order, a
memorandum regarding any appropriate reimbursement. Plaintiffs may file any response
seven (7) days thereafter. Finally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this
Order to the State Bar of New York, of which Acting Attorney General Blanche is a
member (No. 4192456), AND to the District of Columbia Bar, of which Associate Attorney
General Woodward is a member (No. 997320), where disciplinary proceedings are
currently ongoing.

III. CONCLUSION
John Adams warned, “Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes,
our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and
evidence.” Thus, whatever may be the Parties’ wishes, inclinations, or the dictates of their
passion, they cannot alter the state of the facts or evade the rule of law. Contrary to
Plaintiffs’ concern, the Court did not have to “sally forth” to look for a wrong to right. See
DE 89 at 17 (citing Margolin v. Nat’l Ass’n of Immig. Judges, 608 U.S. __ (2026)). The
Court need only look to the uncontroverted facts here:

1. Donald Trump is President.
2. President Trump controls the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury
   Department Scott Bessent, IRS CEO Frank Bisignano, and all Executive
   Branch actors.
3. President Trump, through Executive Order § 7, also controls the litigation
   strategy and interpretation of the laws guiding the Department of Justice. See
   supra note 28.
4. For the 109 days that this case was pending, no attorney representing the
   United States filed a notice of appearance or any document indicating the
   government’s position, interest, or awareness of this matter.
5. Defendants’ actions are consonant with the dictates of Executive Order § 7.

These facts lead to the inexorable conclusion that the “settlement” terms, the
individuals who signed the “settlement” as well as the putative beneficiaries of the
“settlement,” demonstrate a shared, unitary interest. And the unilateral revision and
renunciation of the “Fund” component of the “settlement” demonstrate the fact that all
Parties were aligned, and ultimately, undifferentiated. This action was never about a party
seeking judicial resolution of a legal issue or a factual dispute. The nature of the suit itself
and the conduct of the Parties and counsel from its filing make plain that this was an
attempt to use the Court to provide some legitimacy to an agreement to confer immunity
to people and entities affiliated with the President and to earmark billions of dollars from
American taxpayers to redress grievances not defined in the law. The President may be
the functional “dominus litus” of the Executive Branch, but as a party to a civil suit, he, as
well as all the parties and lawyers before a court, are bound by the rules. Ensuring that
our courts are used only for the express purpose created by the Constitution is the
obligation of every judge and an obligation that this Court must discharge in light of the
matter before it.

In sum, the facts before this Court demonstrate there was never adverseness
between the Parties; there was never a case or controversy; and there was never a
question as to who would prevail.