I built my password manager around one annoying rule: the server cannot read the vault

I built pssmngr around one rule: vault data has to be encrypted in the browser before the server gets it.

That sounds like an implementation detail. It turned into a product constraint pretty quickly.

Search has to happen after unlock, on the client. Sharing needs wrapped keys instead of a backend shortcut that reads an item. Support cannot open somebody's vault to debug it. A normal “forgot password” email cannot reconstruct the vault key either.

The server still knows things needed to run the service: account details, record IDs and timestamps, organization membership, device public keys, and encrypted envelopes. Zero knowledge does not mean zero metadata, and I would rather say that plainly.

The public release is a web app plus a Docker Compose deployment. It does not include the browser extension, a native mobile app, or offline PWA support yet. It also has not completed an independent third-party audit.

Code and threat model: https://github.com/SelmiAbderrahim/pssmngr.com

Hosted version: https://pssmngr.com