If an unjust gender norm makes nonconformity socially costly, should that cost count for less, or not at all, as a reason to conform?

For a concrete example, imagine a man who is indifferent about wearing makeup. He does not particularly want to wear it, but he does not particularly want to avoid it either. There is no suppressed preference in either direction.

Suppose he also knows that men who wear makeup are treated worse in his social environment. People might ridicule him, respect him less, find him less attractive, exclude him socially, or impose other costs on him. The particular cost does not matter for the basic question, and its severity can vary from case to case.

He decides not to wear makeup partly because he wants to avoid being treated that way.

I’m calling that choice “strategic” only because his expectations about how other people will treat him affect what he chooses. This does not assume that he agrees with the gender norm, thinks men should not wear makeup, regards femininity as inferior, or believes that the social penalties are justified. He can reject the norm while still taking the penalties it creates seriously.

I’m interested in whether there is anything morally objectionable about letting those costs influence his decision. More specifically, I’m interested in whether the unjust source of the cost changes how the cost should function as a reason for action.

There are several different questions here that I want to keep separate.

A consideration can be a genuine reason for doing something without being a decisive reason. It can also be a strong reason without being strong enough to determine what someone should do overall. So saying that the social cost gives the man a reason not to wear makeup does not yet mean that he is justified all things considered in avoiding makeup.

One possible view holds that the unjust source of the cost changes the status of the reason itself.

That view might proceed as follows.

(1) Wearing makeup carries a social cost because of an unjust gender norm.

(2) The man avoids wearing makeup partly because of that cost.

(3) For the sake of argument, assume that when many people respond this way, their behavior helps keep the norm in place.

(4) Therefore, the cost created by the norm should count for less, or perhaps not at all, in favor of avoiding makeup.

I understand why someone might move from (1) through (3) to (4), but the inference needs another premise. The fact that responding to a cost helps sustain an unjust norm does not by itself explain why the cost should cease to count, or should count less, for the person who actually bears it.

So I’m interested in what principle would justify that move. Why should the fact that a burden was unjustly created reduce the burden’s force as a reason for trying to avoid it?

There is another possible view.

(1) Being treated worse gives the man a genuine reason not to wear makeup.

(2) If wearing makeup would resist the unjust gender norm, that gives him a genuine reason in favor of wearing it.

(3) The existence of the second reason does not erase the first, and the existence of the first does not erase the second.

(4) The overall moral evaluation depends on the relative strength of those reasons.

On this view, the man can have a real reason to avoid the social cost and a real reason to resist the norm at the same time. Saying that the cost remains a reason does not settle which reason should win.

This distinction matters to me because there is a large difference between saying, “You have a reason to resist this norm that weighs against your reason to avoid the cost,” and saying, “Because the cost was produced by an unjust norm, your desire to avoid that cost should itself count for less.”

I’m interested in whether people endorse either of those positions, and why. Does an unjust social structure merely create an additional reason to resist it, or can the structure also reduce the normative force of the very burdens it imposes on people?