[Discussion] From JTJ to AQI to Da3sh- 16 years of the Islamic State

I wrote this up as a reply to another thread, but I think it's kinda bulky and really stretches to fit the answer to OPs question, so I'm gonna delete my response there and fit it here instead as a self-post. I'm very interested in what the knowledgeable here have to say about its accuracy and more importantly to tell me what I got wrong. The post is also too long for a single text reply, which makes it easier for me to post it here and save it then as a post reply in a thread which might get deleted. Anyway, critique away.

Firstly, the name, and why they have so many different names is worth noting. The group itself presently goes by the name The Islamic State (al-Dowlat al-Islamiyah), but is referred to in the media as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham [greater Syria or the Levant]), ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) IS (Islamic State), and Da3sh/Daesh/Daash (from the Arabic acronym for Dowlat al-Islamiyah fil Iraq wa al-Sham or ISIS). The names are important because the group itself has graduated from various stages of insurgency to major player in Iraq, to regional player in Iraq, Syria, and surrounding areas. Below I'll give a short background on how they came to be, which will give a better explanation.

In 1999, the group Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad- also known as JTJ or Tawhid wal-Jihad) was founded, led by Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. This Sunni Islamist group formed in Jordan then spread to (and mostly moved to) Iraq in the wake of the Iraq war. In 2004, al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin-Laden the group became the al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, renamed (aptly) al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, although their full name was Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn or al-Qaeda/Base Organization for Jihad in Mesopotamia). They recruited heavily from other extremist groups in Iraq and were one of the single largest Sunni insurgent groups to fight in the war.

The organization would remain the most powerful group in (primarily Sunni) al-Anbar province and would pose the greatest threat to security in the region. In 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike and leadership moved to Egyptian member Abu Ayyub al-Masri. In October of that year, the group declared a name change from AQI to ISI, the Islamic State of Iraq, consolidating the Mujahideen Shura Council (a loose alliance of Sunni Islam extremist groups in Iraq) into their folds and declaring their nascent state included the Iraqi provinces of al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Baghdad, Salah al-Din, Babel, and Nineva/Ninewah. The group remained the Iraq affiliate of al-Qaeda, but was moving towards al-Qaeda leader (after bin-Laden) Ayman Zawahiri's four part plan for Iraq:

• 1: defeating and expelling US forces from Iraq
• 2: establishing Islamic authority over the state (debate over whether this means a Caliphate or Emirate, though most would say Zawahiri was talking about an Emirate)
• 3: expansion to nations bordering Iraq
• 4: (and least likely) war with Israel

The expansion of the group was largely halted/slowed by the uptick in US/Iraqi operations against the group, the success of the Sunni Awakening (Sons of Iraq/Anbar Salvation/Sons of Anbar) which consisted of local militias partially funded and sponsored by the US and Iraqi government, given the backing of the US/Iraqi military to take over their communities and expel al-Qaeda linked extremists. In exchange they received greater autonomy and control over their communities, and received continued arms and financial support from the government and US (some would call it bribes). Between 2007 to the withdrawal of US troops in 2011, massive strides were made, between US military, Iraqi Security Forces, Sunni Awakening groups, and various other militant factions opposed to ISI, to degrade and destroy ISI's influence and physical abilities, to the point of near obsolescence when the US withdrew in 2011, with much of the group having gone underground or shifted from direct conflict with the US to nearly exclusive sectarian conflict in Baghdad and elsewhere, suicide bombing Shi'a neighborhoods with an appalling frequency.

With regards to leadership, Abu Ayyub al-Masri remained leader of ISI, with another figure known as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (not the same as present day leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) was presented as the actual leader. This gets a bit into the weeds as US intelligence claims there is not and has never been such a person as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, but rather he was a fictitious character built to confuse western intelligence. Either way, in 2010, Abu Ayyub al-Masri was killed in an airstrike, and leadership of the group moved to present day leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2010, ISI was weakened, and as touched upon earlier, had largely moved away from attacks on coalition forces to sectarian conflict against Shi'a militias and Shi'a civilians. With the US withdrawal in 2011, the groups military significance, as a threat to Iraqi sovereignty, was minimal, but their treat as a terrorist group that continued to claim many Iraqi civilian lives remained large.

The withdrawal of US troops saw a tremendous increase in sectarian tensions, owing to a variety of factors, not the least of which being (perceived or otherwise) slights to the Sunni militias in al-Anbar and elsewhere, believed anti-Sunni actions of PM Maliki, and heavy handed responses to Sunni protests, most notably in raids like the 2013 crackdown where dozens were killed and wounded by Iraqi Security Forces. The gradual degradation of the uneasy security situation following American withdrawal hastened during this period. This would lead to a tremendous propaganda and recruiting boon for the group as Sunni militants flocked to their cause under the idea that Sunni rights were being trampled and al-Baghadi's group could protect them and enfranchise them.

At the same time, since 2012 (some claim earlier), a high placed ISI leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, was sent to Syria to establish the ISI branch in Syria, taking advantage of the conflict there. After early successes and heavy recruitment from among Syrian opposition groups, the group formally announced itself as Jabhat al-Nusra l’Ahl as-Sham (Victory/Support Front for the People of Syria). Depending on who you listen to, some claim this group was public about their links to ISI in Iraq, while many maintain they operated as though they were a homegrown organization with no links to ISI. I tend to agree that they were quiet about their Iraq links. In early 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISI leader, announced publically that Jabhat al-Nusra was his brainchild, and that they were to be part of the revamp of ISI into ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Jabhat al-Nusra rejected this claim and refused the official merger, dividing between those who wished to remain with ISIL and those who sought to be an independent group. This division marked the beginning of actual conflict between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, and caused massive damage to be done to Jabhat al-Nusra as many gains were reversed and ISIL became an active player in it's own right in the Syrian Civil War.

Before continuing, it is worth noting that while both groups originated from al-Qaeda, there are significant differences. Both are Salafist Muslim, and both advocate for theocratic rule, but their actions in Syria are very different. ISIL seeks control of territory, with a secondary focus on deposing Assad/other groups. Territorial gains are instrumental to their concept of statehood, and cleansing these areas of non-Sunnis (forced expulsion, genocide, or simply making life unbearable for non-Sunni) is key to their holdings. They wish to incorporporate land, more important than governments or specific borders, into their control, and as such don't particularly recognize national borders. In contrast, Jabhat al-Nusra has Syria specific designs, fighting to overthrow the Syrian government and install themselves as an Islamic Emirate (which is very different from a caliphate). ISIL looks to al-Baghdadi and co for leadership, where Jabhat al-Nusra continues to hold Al Qaeda Core under the leadership of Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri as their doctrinal leadership. ISIL fights to hold and expand ground that touches their borders, where Jabhat al-Nusra wages tactical war against the Assad government (and sometimes other opposition groups) to weaken the position of the government for an eventual takeover. To Jabhat al-Nusra, holding territory is far less significant than acquiring strategic pockets, equipment, fighters, and coalitions of groups wiling to work with them. Of the two, Jabhat al-Nusra seems to be considerably more pragmatic and doctrinally flexible.

Returning to the main point, following continued disputes, al-Qaeda declaration of Jabhat al-Nusra as their official Syrian affiliate, and low level violence between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, in February of 2014, al-Qaeda dissavowed themselves of any relation to ISIL, and ISIL did the same to al-Qaeda, denouncing Zawahiri as unfit to lead the struggle of global jihad. A variety of factors, including an uptick in recruitment, funding from around the region, and massive financial dividends from control of oil rich regions in Iraq, lead to a massive wave of violence as ISIL consolidated control in eastern Syria, launched a series of campaigns in Iraq aimed at reclaiming Sunni areas, and through a series of nearly accidental successes, scored a string of victories against both the Syrian Arab Army and Iraqi Army, culminating in the capture of Mosul, several Syrian military bases, and the launch of a massive media campaign aimed at shocking the West and inciting recruitment from around the world. June 2014 marked the fall of Mosul, a city of over 1 million to ISIL, and on June 29th 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announce ISIL was no longer to use that name, was now simply Islamic State (IS), and that the Islamic State was launching a caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph.

The practical changes were very little, with IS acting exactly the same as ISIL, but now with a strong and independent ideology that could be used for recruitment, centralized leadership, and as a means of setting themselves apart from al-Qaeda and all other Sunni extremist groups. Territory controlled by IS began to organized into administrative units (more so than previously) and calls for allegiance of Sunni Islamist groups around the globe netted an impressive network of groups who pledged bayeh (religious and political allegiance) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It is worth noting however, that this allegiance is largely symbolic, as Islamic groups in the Philippines, Libya, Afghanistan, etc etc, have no physical or financial (known to date) links to the Islamic State and conquest in one area doesn't prevent failure in others.

The fall of Mosul, threats to Mosul Dam, preparation for assaults into the Kurdish north, and an uptick in the capture and public execution of western prisoners (after demands for ransom failed) helped surge US strikes in the region beginning in August, culminatnig in the formal US announcement of a return of limited troops to the region, heavier airstrikes on Iraq, and on September 23, the spread of the air war to Syria, with a coalition of nations beginning heavy strikes on Islamic State positions. The impressive successes of 2013-2014 were effectively halted, and in some areas reversed as fall 2014/spring 2015 air strikes and Iraqi Security Force (as well as Syrian government and opposition group offensives) operations began to decimate Islamic State holdings and gradually begin to retake areas held by them. As of today, it is estimated that 25% of territory seized by the Islamic State by end of summer 2014 (in Iraq) has been retaken by ISF/Peshmerga/Popular Mobilization Units. The air war has had a heavy toll on Islamic State financing as smuggling routes are under aerial overwatch, oil production and transportation networks are destroyed or retaken, and large amounts of heavy military equipment are destroyed with no means of replacement.

The Islamic State has proven to be the most resilient and successful Sunni extremist group in the past century, accomplishing more in two-three years than al-Qaeda could since it's formation in the late 80s. However, the Islamic State appears to be stalling out, as ground offensives fail, recruitment slows, casualties mount, and cash reserves begin to run dry. The Islamic State is FAR from defeated, however the writing is on the wall that if current operations continue and commitment from outside actors (namely the US, Iran, regional intelligence, and the air coalition) remains the same, then gradually, the Islamic State successes will be reversed, and the Islamic State will return to its original form as an insurgency and not an existential threat to the continued survival of a unified Iraqi nation.