r/ethereum•
op-return

Korean peace deal recorded on the eth blockchain. Imagine if...

I'm not a religious guy at all... But I was just thinking:

4000 years ago.... Moses did his thing. 2000 years after that, 2000 years ago Jesus did his thing. A thousand or so years ago Muhammad did his thing. After a thousand years or so, today we can immutably record data. Imagine if any of those fools had that tech. Could you imagine reading a book that you know it hasn't been altered by a single character after a thousand years. God fucking damn it that's crazy.

Posted May 3, 2018, 3:25 AM UTC

1312
Kryptohamsteri•

Jesus was born 25th of december - Pending, Confirmations 1/50.

12
manolows•

I believe the orthodox Christians would take issue with this..... probably would of required a EIP to resolve the issue...

5
Kryptohamsteri•

They could fork to Ethereum Orthodox

8
op-returnOP•

😂

1
wezrule•

Confirmed with Jesus coin

1
holomntn•

Understand I'm saying this as a cryptanalyst, as one of the people of this planet that is most able to understand the long term weaknesses of our security.

Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah like this thing will ever last that long hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah *breathe* hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah

The sha256 etheruem is based on likely won't last another decade. After that every transaction before that point will be suspect. We are relying on the blockchain moving to a new hash algorithm long enough before the break is found that we can transfer all transactions first. So

Hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahah

-6
Urlar•

The sha256 etheruem is based on likely won't last another decade. After that every transaction before that point will be suspect. We are relying on the blockchain moving to a new hash algorithm long enough before the break is found that we can transfer all transactions first.

You're soft in the head mate - once SHA256 comes anywhere close to being crackable the ethereum blockchain could be snapshotted and forked to a new algo. If a double spend were to happen it would be easily spotted and a fork would undo any damage.

3
holomntn•

So to paraphrase what you said

We are relying on the blockchain moving to a new hash algorithm long enough before the break is found that we can transfer all transactions first.

Which is rather exactly what you quoted me as saying.

Now your other issues

once SHA256 comes anywhere close to being crackable

That would be a couple years ago. Sha256 is at the very edge of acceptable and will likely not last a decade, exactly as I said before.

the ethereum blockchain could be snapshotted and forked to a new algo.

That would not actually solve the problem.

If a double spend were to happen it would be easily spotted and a fork would undo any damage.

And that is just entirely ignoring the problem. The problem with that idea is that every single transaction before the change is suspect. If the hash can be broken then any transaction can be magically made "real". A fork isn't going to solve the problem of an endless stream of hundreds of bad transactions per hour, unless you think hundreds of forks per hour is at all reasonable.

The actual solution is not to snapshot the blockchain, that would not actually solve the problem. Every transaction needs to be reverified with the new algorithm.

This raises other problems in that every single signature needs to be redone, since those are based on the same sha256 algorithm.

This move takes a long time.

It is quite incorrect to believe that a break of sha256 could be addressed in any reasonable length of time.

1
Urlar•

For one you're forgetting that private key consists of an n-rounded 256 bit hash AND a 256 bit salt.

Second, Ethereum doesn't use SHA-256 - it uses Keccak-256, but I'll let that slide because I believe they require the same absurd number of qubit cycles on a quantum computer to compromise. Aside from that this isn't asymmetric encryption we're talking about (which I will concede is reasonably vulnerable to quantum attack), we're talking salted, nonced hashes with randomly generated seeds.

Which is rather exactly what you quoted me as saying.

My point was that once SHA256 comes anywhere close to being crackable.

That would be a couple years ago. Sha256 is at the very edge of acceptable and will likely not last a decade, exactly as I said before.

What's your proposed attack vector? Back up your point. Estimates I've heard put it closer to 100 years and even that is nothing more than wild speculation. There is absolutely no way that in 10 years time we'll be capable of producing "useful" collisions on-demand when it comes to Ethereum.

That would not actually solve the problem.

Again, back up your points. You only make assertions and don't explain what your reasoning is. When a tire on your car goes flat you don't rebuild the car from scratch or buy a new car - you do what needs to be done to get the car work. In that regard I don't see anything wrong with snapshotting, and while forking is undesirable if it has to be done it has to be done and there's no two ways about it. As long as it's done before computational capacity reaches threat level there's little reason for users not to trust the snapshot.

And that is just entirely ignoring the problem. The problem with that idea is that every single transaction before the change is suspect.

Checking for double spends isn't exactly a hugely difficult process.

Every transaction needs to be reverified with the new algorithm.

As I said before - as long as this is done before computing technology reaches threat level there's little reason for users not to trust a snapshot.

This raises other problems in that every single signature needs to be redone, since those are based on the same sha256 algorithm.

This sounds like a good point but really isn't. We aren't hashing a 10 character password here where a lookup table would be of use, and a full hash table would probably take a computer the size of the universe - we're talking salted, nonced transactions pushing the limits of the Keccak algo.

It is quite incorrect to believe that a break of sha256 could be addressed in any reasonable length of time.

Just as I think it's "quite incorrect" to believe that SHA-256 could be broken in any reasonable length of time. Another assertion with no reasoning or explanation to back it up.

4
holomntn•

For one you're forgetting that private key consists of an n-rounded 256 bit hash AND a 256 bit salt.

Actually I'm not. The optimal attack doesn't even bother going after the hash. The attack goes after the private key itself. That takes the same 2^128 work on a classic computer, but is effectively real time in quantum, and has been known as such since at least 2003 ("Shor's discrete logarithm quantum algorithm for elliptic curves", John Proos, Christof Zalka)

With recent advances in quantum computing putting the limit at ~100 qbits, this is the very edge of safety. Google announced a 72 qubit about a month ago.

Even without breaking the hash this allows arbitrary stolen coins.

Just to add more worry, there are two preindicator problems that should fall before ecDLP (the ECDH and ECDSA core problem), those are IFP and iDLP. There have been indicators for the last few years that IFP is close to falling, and iDLP tends to fall soon afterward. These indicators are I believe a major factor in the NSA decision to effectively halt rollout of the Suite B that we all rely on.

we're talking salted, nonced hashes with randomly generated seeds.

We're also talking about hashes where classic computers have a generic algorithm to square root the time take (256-bit hash only costs 2^128 work) and quantum computers have a generic algorithm to square root the classic time to break (2^128 work becomes 2^64 work). So we are relying on quantum computers not scaling in the two directions they are scaling, number of qubits and longevity.

Which is rather exactly what you quoted me as saying.

My point was that once SHA256 comes anywhere close to being crackable.

Where exactly do you consider this line? 50% of the qubits necessary? 80%?

With the growth rate of the last two records being 22 qubits per 120 days, the growth rate is currently very very fast (https://futurism.com/ibm-announced-50-qubit-quantum-computer/ and https://gizmodo.com/google-unveils-largest-quantum-computer-yet-but-so-wha-1823546420) we are closing in on whatever barrier you want to consider.

Even in the classic world, 2^128 work is the bare minimum acceptable. Again, what exact threshold do you consider "anywhere close"? 50%, 80%, 90% of the bits? Each block of Bitcoin currently stands at over 55%.

That would be a couple years ago. Sha256 is at the very edge of acceptable and will likely not last a decade, exactly as I said before.

What's your proposed attack vector?

Two primary vectors.

The sha-0/1/2 series is all built on the same foundation and very narrowly avoids attack. Attacks never get worse, sha-0 fell almost immediately, sha-1 fell a few years ago, sha-2 should be expected soon.

As you noted this is rather irrelevant to ethereum as it uses sha-3 (KECCAK) which has a different foundation. But sha-3 as well only narrowly avoids attack, distinguishers were given in the original paper. No one has a way to use these as of yet, but they remain worrisome.

Quantum computing provides a more straightforward vector. Against quantum attack Sha3-256 is only 2^64 work, well below the safe limit. The only things stopping this attack today are the relatively inability stop scale quantum (see earlier, that barrier is failing us) and the inability to keep a quantum computers running for long periods of time. This vector is worryingly close to failing.

That would not actually solve the problem.

Again, back up your points. You only make assertions and don't explain what your reasoning is.

Ok, let's walk through this. Let's make a magic wand. This magic wand allows me to duplicate your private key. We know the magic wand exists. Prove a signature is made by you and not by me. The signatures are indistinguishable.

The private key attack is that magic wand. And it is worryingly close. To combat the attack we need to move long enough before the attack surfaces that every single private key can be moved to the new algorithm, this takes a very long time.

Now let's consider a different magic wand. This wand allows me to create a block with an identical hash. I pick an early block to avoid too much apparently disturbance, but I have my magic wand on a block with a significant amount of unspent ether, the only change I make is that unspent ether goes to me. I now use this block to poison the well, I distribute this new block as widely as I can, but more importantly I wave the magic wand at a recent block that spends the coins.

Prove which block series is correct. It is actually impossible, the two series are indistinguishable. We need to move to a different hash long enough before that attack materializes that every single block can be recertified with the new algorithm before the blocks are questioned.

And that is just entirely ignoring the problem. The problem with that idea is that every single transaction before the change is suspect.

Checking for double spends isn't exactly a hugely difficult process.

The double spends aren't the worry. The determining which spend is authentic giving a series of fake with either one or zero real is the problem.

This raises other problems in that every single signature needs to be redone, since those are based on the same sha256 algorithm.

This sounds like a good point but really isn't. We aren't hashing a 10 character password here where a lookup table would be of use, and a full hash table would probably take a computer the size of the universe - we're talking salted, nonced transactions pushing the limits of the Keccak algo.

You're thinking of the wrong attack. This isn't going after the hash, this is going after the private key. I should revise the statement though, every single account currently with any holdings would need to move everything to a new signature method before the old method is broken. Any account that has not transferred everything to the new algorithm suffers from the private key attack problem. There is no good solution to that problem.

It is quite incorrect to believe that a break of sha256 could be addressed in any reasonable length of time.

Just as I think it's "quite incorrect" to believe that SHA-256 could be broken in any reasonable length of time. Another assertion with no reasoning or explanation to back it up.

The changeover would have to be a fork. First the fork has to be developed, then the backwards calculations recertifying every transaction under the new chain, then a vote taken, and when the vote hits threshold a hard fork happens. This may not seem like it will take a lot of time, but developing the changes needed to use a longer hash will almost certainly require extensive changes in the code to adjust many different lengths, this cascades significantly, at least tow months are necessary. Two months of being actively vulnerable to attack is two months too long and would destroy the vast majority of the value stored.

Work needs to be done extremely soon. The other problem is that no one has a real answer for quantum yet. 512-bit hashes help, but are a stopgap measure until we can develop analysis capabilities in quantum space. Quantum resistant cryptography to replace the one the key pair is far from ready, and might be decades from being ready. The best available is NTRU and I've personally called one of their proposals a "worthless piece of shit" and had an extended discussion with their founders about why it simply isn't ready yet, and again that's the best option.

1