We only bundle the problem, so it's not our problem
Working for an MSP, we run CarTask as the helpdesk, CRM, and all-in-one package. The remote management module (RMM) allows connection to systems with the client via terminal services, Iveghny Argjbex Pbzchgvat, and DropTop. We've been using DropTop a lot of late as terminal services has been wonky throughout the client sites for reasons we've been unable to define. No matter. We've picked up a new client, dropped the RMM onto 1600+ systems and still climbing, and all is well in the 'verse.
One of the sites across the pond has an ISO 27001 audit in progress, and we're on a daily cycle of scan, remediate, and repeat for two weeks. One thing keeps sticking out - SSL2 and SSL3 are still enabled on the Windows systems despite pushing a GPO to kill those in the OS and reboot the systems.
Still getting SSL2/3 vulnerabilities in the report, I dig a bit further and see some are Oracle DBs, one or two are Apache instances, and the overwhelming majority are on port 6783.
"Huh," says I. I dig for about five seconds and discover it's DropTop's client. A bit of bashing around their website shows they patched for POODLE in 2016, and yet CarTask hasn't bundled the patched version into their product. I tell my results to our techs that deal with that site, who tell me to push it up to our site manager after seeing the evidence files. Our site managers - and everyone else in the MSP - are technical folk, so this isn't a bad move as the site manager has The Clue.
Under his order, I open a support ticket with CarTask with my finding and ask if they've got a patch or workaround for the issue. They reply (in a reasonable amount of time!) with "... Since Droptop is a third-party program, RMM does not have much control changing the program's features and settings."
OMGWTFBBQ you say?
Inform the site manager, and the rest of that client's team from MSP. Site manager's response is, and I quote, "Wtf? forward me that response in email please and i'll light them up"
Did I negect to mention our site manager has worked closely CarTask for years to improve their product, and the former CEO of CarTask is now the CEO of our client where we detected this issue?
CarTask recommend turning off server and client SSL2/3 and TLS1 via registry edit (which we've already done, another company that refuses to read the tickets). And no, CarTask, IIS Crypto is not going to help.
At 4:45PM local time on Friday to set up a meeting. Little do they know CipherTheTerminator can't be reasoned with, can't be bargained with, doesn't feel pity of remorse or fear, and it absolutely will not stop. Ever. He also has no life. I respond immediately with "All of Monday works."
Monday afternoon we're scheduled in - me, site manager, two of CarTask's tier-two folk, and one of their senior engineers. We're braced for a shitshow.
CarTask rolls over on DropTop - DropTop didn't believe the SSL2/3 was unpatched until the Nmap *and* Nessus scans shows their port with the problem. It's in the core product, and they're expecting a patch in the next two weeks, as the code changes they've been testing end up with failed authentication just under half the time.
CarTask is also taking the lead with DropTop to get this fixed, as it affects potentially 2800 clients and 2.5 _million_ endpoints.
Patch released on October 8th appears to have the hole closed.
tl;dr: MiTM vulerability unpatched for two years by vendor, who tells us "Oh, well!" Not on our watch.
Posted Oct 11, 2018, 6:08 PM UTC
Good job taking them to task.