A vulnerability in the ABC roadmap?
Posted Dec 14, 2018, 3:47 PM UTC
Posted Dec 14, 2018, 3:47 PM UTC
Rainbow tables face frequent chain collisions due to their reduction functions. These map the large key space of the hashing function to the vastly smaller key space of passwords it contains.
Merklix trees don't have a reduction function applied on every round and the key space of potential inputs (transactions) is larger than than the output of the hash function. Not only would you need to find a hash collision, you'd need to find collisions between equally valid transactions.
A reduction function is pretty arbitrary, you can make it do basically anything, as long as it is repeatable and consistently produces the same result each time the chain is to be calculated.
The reduction function is not arbitrary at all. It reduces the key space and defines the covered inputs. It is the reason why chain collisions frequently occur.
You're missing the point. Rainbow tables are only useful when the key space of the passwords is smaller than the space of their hash. That's not the case here.
Note that this fact is the reason that using a strong salt makes rainbow tables basically useless.
Note that this fact is the reason that using a strong salt makes rainbow tables basically useless.
Hell, a weak salt can render them useless. Even a shared secret value used to salt all the entries of a system requires recomputing the whole table and makes it only valid for that one system/secret, eliminating the benefit of the precomputed table.
This attack is not about passwords...
lol every blockchain is broken in his ms paint dribble
he wants $100k reward for his ms paint dribble
Nope only things that use a merklix tree. Merkle trees while not impervious are magnitudes more safe.
If one is to construct a chain of valid transactions as the above then if a hash result is found that matches one already in the blockchain...
I don't think this the author of this understands how hashes work. The chances of finding a hash that matches is damn near impossible. Even if it was, this isn't a problem just for BCH, it's a problem for all cryptography.
Birthday attack. You only need to find one that matches and it can be any where in the chain. At scale you will have trillions of potential hashes to use.
That's not how the birthday paradox works. Birthday attacks are valid for any two arbitrary inputs. If one of those inputs is fixed it no longer applies.
Looks like we have a new troll narrative...
I'm really at a loss how people are so quick to put out material that embarrasses themselves like this.
Every comment I make or article I write I ask myself "How likely is it that I'm wrong and will make an ass of myself if I click publish?"
Apparently these guys have no shame.
I'm sure they rely on people not knowing what they are talking about and just believing them blindly (like history has shown us time and time again).
Haha coming from you that is hilarious Chris.