Leger Device security vs trezor
What does the physical security of a ledger vs a trezor look like? I know that the ledger has a secure element and that the trezor has not, but lets assume I use a passphrase on both devices and lets assume that someone steals my hardware wallet as attack scenario.
My 24 seed phrase + passphrase seems to only be protected by the PIN of the ledger devices, wouldn't an attacker be able to just bruteforce this PIN and get to both my seed phrase and passphrase at the same time? How long would it take someone to bruteforce a 4 digit pin, 6 digit pin or 8 digit pin? I would image it is not very long.
Now contrast this with the trezor, the trezor does not store your passphrase on the device, you need to enter it via the software that uses your trezor. That means that when someone steals the trezor device, it should not be able to get to my 25th passphrase.
So isn't the trezor device more secure in this attack scenario?
Posted Aug 3, 2020, 8:46 AM UTC
You can do exactly the same with Ledger if you want - just use a temporary passphrase. I wouldn't suggest you use passphrases unless you're absolutely sure about what you're doing though, because it's an easy way to lose assets if you forget about it - that's a major difference with Trezor, where they're absolutely mandatory if you want to have some kind of (inconvenient and partly broken) protection against physical attackers.
But on the ledger you have to type in your passphrase via the device every time, right? That makes it much more inconvinient, and people either won't use it or they will pick suprt short passphrases which both harm security.
If you contrast this with the trezor, it lets you type in your passphrase via software on your computer. Yes, your computer may have malware on it and you may give away your passphrase this way, but without the seed phrase the passphrase is useless.
So to recap: If someone steals your ledger, they can bruteforce the pin and get to your money in a day or a couple of days (Is that fair?). On a trezor, someone will have to steal your device AND install malware on your PC to get to your passphrase.
Doesn't that mean that indeed, a trezor is more secure against physical attacks?
You can also type it on a computer if you want, even though I would recommend it even less than having a passphrase (see https://github.com/LedgerHQ/blue-loader-python/blob/master/ledgerblue/hostOnboard.py)
Also there's no simple way to bruteforce the PIN on a smartcard chip - it's not a MCU you can break in 2 minutes.
With passphrase, absolutely yes
With a passphrase an attacker could flash an arbitrary firmware that make you reveal it. The attack is slightly more complex to pull off - you'd either have to swap the device for another one in the process, or force the firmware into the current device without damaging the case (which is realistic through electromagnetic fault injection, IMHO)