Since the confirmation of the cancellation of the contract for the acquisition of 12 Shortfin Barracuda conventional submarines designed by the French Naval Group, and the integration of Canberra in a tripartite alliance with the United States and Great Britain including, among other things, the sale of American nuclear attack submarines, the defence community has been in turmoil, particularly in France. "Backstab", "betrayal" There is no shortage of adjectives to describe this decision, both in terms of its content and the form in which it was made public, seriously damaging the international image of the French naval industry for many years to come. On the other hand, very few, including among the Anglo-Saxon media, seem to care about the geopolitical consequences of such a decision. Yet these are both numerous and potentially extremely dangerous, both for peace in the Indo-Pacific theater and for the entire planet.
For some forty years, the Americans, the British, the Russians, the French and the Chinese have had a common tacit understanding of the non-proliferation treaty. If the treaty strictly forbade the export or transfer of nuclear weapons technology, this also extended, by capillary action, to the use of nuclear energy as a source of energy for military equipment. In other words, there was no question of the five permanent members of the Security Council allowing a new actor to enter their restricted circle, unless the latter managed to acquire by itself the technologies necessary to design a reactor capable of entering a submarine or a warship. In fact, the nuclear-powered submarine fleet remained restricted to these countries. India developed its own reactor, which allowed it to join this group with the Arihant-class SSBNs, and which allowed Moscow to lease it an Akula-class nuclear attack submarine. And although France is accompanying Brazil in its nuclear attack submarine programme, in no case is it involved in the design of the reactor itself, its assistance being limited to its integration into a ship.
In fact, when Joe Biden, Boris Johnson and Scott Morrisson announced that the United States and Great Britain would export nuclear attack submarines to Australia, a country which does not even have a civilian nuclear programme, and which until recently forbade nuclear-powered submarines from entering its ports, the three men were transgressing all the tacit rules which have made it possible to limit the proliferation of this type of weaponry in the world. This point is not ignored, as Joe Biden himself has indicated that every effort will be made to respect the non-proliferation pact. If there is no doubt that it will indeed be respected in letter, it will undoubtedly be transgressed in spirit. From now on, there is nothing to prevent Beijing from selling SNAs to Islamabad or Pyongyang, just as Moscow will be able to offer its own Yasen-M to New Delhi, Cairo or Caracas within a very short timeframe. This change of paradigm could even be a good thing for Paris, as the Suffren class is by far the most cost-effective SNA in the West at the moment, with a construction cost of around $1.2 billion, compared with $1.9 billion for the British Astute, and nearly $2.8 billion for the American Virginia, and opportunities in South Korea, India and Brazil.
In the months and years to come, we can therefore expect to see an increase in the number of announcements of export contracts for this type of vessel, which are nothing more than mobile nuclear power plants. However, if the 5 permanent members of the Security Council have so far avoided having to find themselves in a conflict in which they could lose such a ship (with the exception of Great Britain during the Falklands War), their multiplication in the world's navies will considerably increase the risk that one or more of these ships will be destroyed. Indeed, the risks of seeing Pakistan and India, or the two Koreas fighting each other are much higher than a conflagration involving the United States, Russia, China, and the two Europeans of the Security Council.
On the other hand, now that Washington has scrapped this tacit agreement, why shouldn't Moscow, Beijing and even Paris, which is clearly no longer considered a full ally by the United States and Britain, feel justified in defying other prohibitions, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign soil (which the United States is already doing within NATO, by the way). In other words, after the withdrawal from the INF and Open Skies treaties, largely attributed to Donald Trump's personality, Joe Biden has just struck another, far more important, blow to the post-Cold War architecture that managed to balance forces and tensions over the last 30 years. It is therefore a profound move instigated by the United States, and one that goes far beyond the personalities of the presidents themselves.
French leaders have been calling since this morning to accelerate the construction of a united and supportive Europe of Defense. However, it is very unlikely that the Europeans will take a position alongside France in this matter, since the vast majority of them know that they depend on US protection against Russia, especially since the start of a new major arms race has obviously just been given by the Westerners themselves. The French authorities, whoever they may be, will therefore have to decide in the near future between resigning themselves to a posture of subordination to the United States alongside their European neighbors within the framework of NATO's integrated command, or taking up the difficult path of national strategic autonomy, as General de Gaulle had done in his time. It is difficult, from now on, to avoid such a debate in the country, with the numerous consequences that this would entail. As the title of this article indicates, Joe Biden has opened, by this manoeuvre, a very dangerous Pandora's box, the consequences of which could go far beyond Australia and the Pacific Theatre.
Since the confirmation of the cancellation of the contract for the acquisition of 12 Shortfin Barracuda conventional submarines designed by the French Naval Group, and the integration of Canberra in a tripartite alliance with the United States and Great Britain including, among other things, the sale of American nuclear attack submarines, the defence community has been in turmoil, particularly in France. "Backstab", "betrayal" There is no shortage of adjectives to describe this decision, both in terms of its content and the form in which it was made public, seriously damaging the international image of the French naval industry for many years to come. On the other hand, very few, including among the Anglo-Saxon media, seem to care about the geopolitical consequences of such a decision. Yet these are both numerous and potentially extremely dangerous, both for peace in the Indo-Pacific theater and for the entire planet.
For some forty years, the Americans, the British, the Russians, the French and the Chinese have had a common tacit understanding of the non-proliferation treaty. If the treaty strictly forbade the export or transfer of nuclear weapons technology, this also extended, by capillary action, to the use of nuclear energy as a source of energy for military equipment. In other words, there was no question of the five permanent members of the Security Council allowing a new actor to enter their restricted circle, unless the latter managed to acquire by itself the technologies necessary to design a reactor capable of entering a submarine or a warship. In fact, the nuclear-powered submarine fleet remained restricted to these countries. India developed its own reactor, which allowed it to join this group with the Arihant-class SSBNs, and which allowed Moscow to lease it an Akula-class nuclear attack submarine. And although France is accompanying Brazil in its nuclear attack submarine programme, in no case is it involved in the design of the reactor itself, its assistance being limited to its integration into a ship.
In fact, when Joe Biden, Boris Johnson and Scott Morrisson announced that the United States and Great Britain would export nuclear attack submarines to Australia, a country which does not even have a civilian nuclear programme, and which until recently forbade nuclear-powered submarines from entering its ports, the three men were transgressing all the tacit rules which have made it possible to limit the proliferation of this type of weaponry in the world. This point is not ignored, as Joe Biden himself has indicated that every effort will be made to respect the non-proliferation pact. If there is no doubt that it will indeed be respected in letter, it will undoubtedly be transgressed in spirit. From now on, there is nothing to prevent Beijing from selling SNAs to Islamabad or Pyongyang, just as Moscow will be able to offer its own Yasen-M to New Delhi, Cairo or Caracas within a very short timeframe. This change of paradigm could even be a good thing for Paris, as the Suffren class is by far the most cost-effective SNA in the West at the moment, with a construction cost of around $1.2 billion, compared with $1.9 billion for the British Astute, and nearly $2.8 billion for the American Virginia, and opportunities in South Korea, India and Brazil.
In the months and years to come, we can therefore expect to see an increase in the number of announcements of export contracts for this type of vessel, which are nothing more than mobile nuclear power plants. However, if the 5 permanent members of the Security Council have so far avoided having to find themselves in a conflict in which they could lose such a ship (with the exception of Great Britain during the Falklands War), their multiplication in the world's navies will considerably increase the risk that one or more of these ships will be destroyed. Indeed, the risks of seeing Pakistan and India, or the two Koreas fighting each other are much higher than a conflagration involving the United States, Russia, China, and the two Europeans of the Security Council.
On the other hand, now that Washington has scrapped this tacit agreement, why shouldn't Moscow, Beijing and even Paris, which is clearly no longer considered a full ally by the United States and Britain, feel justified in defying other prohibitions, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign soil (which the United States is already doing within NATO, by the way). In other words, after the withdrawal from the INF and Open Skies treaties, largely attributed to Donald Trump's personality, Joe Biden has just struck another, far more important, blow to the post-Cold War architecture that managed to balance forces and tensions over the last 30 years. It is therefore a profound move instigated by the United States, and one that goes far beyond the personalities of the presidents themselves.
French leaders have been calling since this morning to accelerate the construction of a united and supportive Europe of Defense. However, it is very unlikely that the Europeans will take a position alongside France in this matter, since the vast majority of them know that they depend on US protection against Russia, especially since the start of a new major arms race has obviously just been given by the Westerners themselves. The French authorities, whoever they may be, will therefore have to decide in the near future between resigning themselves to a posture of subordination to the United States alongside their European neighbors within the framework of NATO's integrated command, or taking up the difficult path of national strategic autonomy, as General de Gaulle had done in his time. It is difficult, from now on, to avoid such a debate in the country, with the numerous consequences that this would entail. As the title of this article indicates, Joe Biden has opened, by this manoeuvre, a very dangerous Pandora's box, the consequences of which could go far beyond Australia and the Pacific Theatre.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)