The forward party should run on a condorcet version of ranked choice voting.
Hey, so obviously ranked choice voting is one of the main pillars of the forward party platform. Often when people talk about RCV they're referring to Instant runoff voting, or IRV, but today I want to make the case that the forward party should advocate for a different kind of RCV. Namely, one that guarantees selecting a condorcet winner if there is one.
For those Who don't know, an election has a condorcet winner when one of the candidates would get the majority of votes against any other candidate if they were in a head to head election with them. Occasionally an election will not have a condorcet winner because you get a scenario where voters as a group preferred A to be, & preferred B to C, but also preferred C to A. This is called a condorcet cycle. in these scenarios, some other method for determining the winner among the candidates in the cycle is used. so it would be an option in those cases to revert to IRV. Checking for a condorcet winner also only requires voters to rank their preferences like they do with IRV, so it won't be super complicated for voters.
To explain why we should always check for a condorcet winner & select them if they're present, Imagine a scenario where some election results comes out that shows the forward party with very little first choice support but all the Ds & Rs have the forward party as their second choice over the other major party. this would mean the forward is technically the condorcet winner. if it was only Forward & dems, forward would win. If it was only forward & reps, forward would win, but under IRV they get eliminated early because they have the lowest 1st choice support. Relying on 1st choice support for a metric of which party is the most popular is a mistake.
There are also condorcet mthods that can find multiple winners for occasions when that is called for.
You can read more about condorcet voting methods here.
Posted Sep 30, 2021, 4:39 AM UTC
Love this idea! One thing that I think would make this even better is if we went beyond ranked methods by upgrading the ballot format a second time. Rated ballots are simpler to fill out than ranked ballots while also capturing more voter preference information. They even manage to have a lower spoilage rate than our current single-mark ballots!
Since rated ballots collect strictly more information than ranked ballots, it's entirely possible to have rated Condorcet methods. Smith//Score is an excellent example of such a method, and simulations have shown it to be on par with other top Condorcet methods and other top rated methods.
I'm pretty much willing to do any method people want for resolving a Condorcet cycle. If you want it to be score voting that's fine by me. As long as we're always selecting from the Smith set, I'm satisfied.
The one thing I'll say is that depending on how detailed voters can be with the scoring of candidates, you might still need them to rank the candidates ordinally in addition to scoring them. If you can only give scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 & no ranking then the ability of voters to express ordinal preference of candidates they feel similarly about is not really there. If the score range is large enough then you can require that voters not give more than one candidate the same score & then you can rely on the scores to derive the ordinal rankings.
This is part of why hybrid methods tend to deliver the most accurate results. By adding a preference-focused step in the tabulation like in STAR Voting and Smith//Score, voters are incentivized to show both level of support and preference order. Scoring is easier and provides more data to work with, but that quality of information may be lower. The preference incentive forces voters to expend additional cognitive energy to increase the quality of data they’re providing. And limited ranges are actually an important piece of this; humans can only hold about 5 to 7 different things in headspace at a time to compare to each other, so by limiting the range to around those numbers and combining support and preference incentives, all voters are incentivized to vote expressively, leveraging the full range of their ballots. This helps to “normalize” what voters are expressing on their ballots. With large ranges, voters will tend to crowd their scores around the endpoints and the midpoint. For example, given the range 0 to 99, the most common scores by far are 0, 1, 49, 50, 51, 98, and 99. A limited range is key to leveling the playing field and maximizing both the quantity and quality of information gathered.
Most quality Condorcet methods allow voters rank candidates equally, so why would equal scores not be allowed?
Yeah, if you can express rank preference among candidates that you've given the same score, then a small score range is fine with me in the context of a smith//score method.
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Personally I don't think passing the Smith criterion is necessary for a voting method to be good, but methods that do pass it seem to perform quite well in practice so I'm happy to support them.
Small rating scales are a concern, but it's important to keep in mind that most implementations of ranked ballots in the US limit voters to ranking 3-5 candidates. Even with only 6 ratings (0-5 is the smallest scale commonly proposed outside of approval voting), a rated ballot would do a better job than those implementations at collecting ordinal preferences.
Sure, I disagree with limiting how many candidates you can rank. All of those ranked system are IRV as far as I know so it's a bit moot anyway.
What do you mean that they perform well "in practice"? It's not like we see Condorcet methods widely utilized in the real world.
It's not entirely moot since it does set a precident for how ranked ballots are formatted. That precident can of course be ignored, but you'll likely have to justify the decision to use more ballot space.
Sorry, I worded that badly. I meant that the Condorcet methods that seem to actually be advocated for consistently perform well in simulations.
Bottom Two Runoff is the simplest to encode legislation concisely, unless you want to go with straight-ahead Condorcet language, but then you need a "completion method" in case there is a cycle (which has never happened in a governmental election).
The 'straight ahead' language is actually fine, with similarly concise language mentioning the desired 'cycle tiebreaker' behavior.
Implementation within the legislated specification is entirely the purview of election authorities/administrators. Law is directive, not algorithmic nor a formal academic proof; plurality voting laws do not include proof of that addition is commutative, instructions on how to add, or specify what brand pen must be used.
Better to have election law language be as concise plain English as possible, and also pass support for appropriate election heads to generate definitive manuals for election officials to follow. (As they do now)
This is how most law is conducted; even the most verbose 1000 page bills leave all the details to the executive, subject to the judicial. Specific and unambiguous is important, but formal isn't.
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Here is Hare RCV (a.k.a. IRV):
All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:
(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall not be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.
(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.
(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "continuing candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been defeated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is defeated and all candidates begin as continuing candidates.
(4) In each round, every ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with fewest votes is defeated in the current round.
(5) The aforementioned instant runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, shall be repeated until only two candidates remain. The remaining candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes is elected.
(6) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.
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Here is Bottom-Two Runoff:
All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:
(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall not be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.
(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.
(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "continuing candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been defeated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is defeated and all candidates begin as continuing candidates.
(4) In each round, every ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein denoted as "A" and "B", shall contend in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support shall be defeated in the current round. If the number of ballots ranking A higher than B exceeds the number of ballots ranking B higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is defeated, and A continues to the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots ranking B higher than A exceeds the number of ballots ranking A higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is defeated, and B continues to the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measures of voter support of A and B are tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is defeated in the current round.
(5) The aforementioned instant runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, shall be repeated until only two candidates remain. The remaining candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes is elected.
(6) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.
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Here is straight-ahead Condorcet (version 1):
All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:
(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.
(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.
(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The candidate, who is the Condorcet winner, is elected if the rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats, with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (3), then the candidate with the plurality of first preferences is elected.
(5) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.
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Here is another straight-ahead Condorcet (version 2):
All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:
(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.
(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.
(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The retabulation shall examine every possible pairing of candidates. Given N as the number of candidates, then the number of possible pairings of candidates is N(N-1)/2. For each possible pairing of candidates, if the number of ballots marked ranking a selected candidate over the other candidate is fewer than the number of ballots marked to the contrary, then the selected candidate is designated as defeated. After all candidate pairs are examined, the candidate who remains not designated as defeated is the Condorcet winner and is elected.
(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (3), then the candidate having the plurality of first preferences is elected.
(5) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.
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No, score performs quite well when there are 3 or more candidates, including when voters vote tactically. Not to mention that there are other rated methods that can discourage tactical voting such as STAR, 3-2-1, and of course Smith//Score.
You're ignoring what I said.
When there are 3 or more candidates on the ballot, every voter must decide how much they will score their second choice. That decision is inherently tactical.
This is also a problem for Approval Voting. When there are 3 or more candidates on the ballot, every voter must decide whether their political interests are best served by Approving their second choice or not. That decision is inherently tactical.
Score and Approval are both cardinal methods (differing only in the number of scoring levels provided) and that is the source of the inherent burden of tactical voting.
How in the world did you come to that conclusion?
People have approximately cardinal preferences, not approximately ordinal preferences. Thus it is entirely possible to cast an honest rated ballot. All you need to do is normalize your preferences such that your most preferred candidate has the highest rating and your least preferred the lowest rating, then round to the nearest rating for each of the other candidates.
As an example, say I like A a lot better than B, and I like B somewhat better than C. Specifically, my preference between A and B is roughly 3 times as strong as my preference between B and C (you could represent this as A>>>B>C). If I'm rating on a 0-5 scale, I find that after normalizing my score for B is 1.25, which rounds to 1. Therefore, my honest rated ballot is A/5, B/1, C/0.