The forward party should run on a condorcet version of ranked choice voting.

Hey, so obviously ranked choice voting is one of the main pillars of the forward party platform. Often when people talk about RCV they're referring to Instant runoff voting, or IRV, but today I want to make the case that the forward party should advocate for a different kind of RCV. Namely, one that guarantees selecting a condorcet winner if there is one.

For those Who don't know, an election has a condorcet winner when one of the candidates would get the majority of votes against any other candidate if they were in a head to head election with them. Occasionally an election will not have a condorcet winner because you get a scenario where voters as a group preferred A to be, & preferred B to C, but also preferred C to A. This is called a condorcet cycle. in these scenarios, some other method for determining the winner among the candidates in the cycle is used. so it would be an option in those cases to revert to IRV. Checking for a condorcet winner also only requires voters to rank their preferences like they do with IRV, so it won't be super complicated for voters.

To explain why we should always check for a condorcet winner & select them if they're present, Imagine a scenario where some election results comes out that shows the forward party with very little first choice support but all the Ds & Rs have the forward party as their second choice over the other major party. this would mean the forward is technically the condorcet winner. if it was only Forward & dems, forward would win. If it was only forward & reps, forward would win, but under IRV they get eliminated early because they have the lowest 1st choice support. Relying on 1st choice support for a metric of which party is the most popular is a mistake.

There are also condorcet mthods that can find multiple winners for occasions when that is called for.

You can read more about condorcet voting methods here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method

Posted Sep 30, 2021, 4:39 AM UTC

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BTernaryTau•

Love this idea! One thing that I think would make this even better is if we went beyond ranked methods by upgrading the ballot format a second time. Rated ballots are simpler to fill out than ranked ballots while also capturing more voter preference information. They even manage to have a lower spoilage rate than our current single-mark ballots!

Since rated ballots collect strictly more information than ranked ballots, it's entirely possible to have rated Condorcet methods. Smith//Score is an excellent example of such a method, and simulations have shown it to be on par with other top Condorcet methods and other top rated methods.

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

I'm pretty much willing to do any method people want for resolving a Condorcet cycle. If you want it to be score voting that's fine by me. As long as we're always selecting from the Smith set, I'm satisfied.

The one thing I'll say is that depending on how detailed voters can be with the scoring of candidates, you might still need them to rank the candidates ordinally in addition to scoring them. If you can only give scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 & no ranking then the ability of voters to express ordinal preference of candidates they feel similarly about is not really there. If the score range is large enough then you can require that voters not give more than one candidate the same score & then you can rely on the scores to derive the ordinal rankings.

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jman722Yang Gang•

If you can only give scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5 & no ranking, then the ability of voters to express ordinal preference of candidates they feel similarly about is not really there.

This is part of why hybrid methods tend to deliver the most accurate results. By adding a preference-focused step in the tabulation like in STAR Voting and Smith//Score, voters are incentivized to show both level of support and preference order. Scoring is easier and provides more data to work with, but that quality of information may be lower. The preference incentive forces voters to expend additional cognitive energy to increase the quality of data they’re providing. And limited ranges are actually an important piece of this; humans can only hold about 5 to 7 different things in headspace at a time to compare to each other, so by limiting the range to around those numbers and combining support and preference incentives, all voters are incentivized to vote expressively, leveraging the full range of their ballots. This helps to “normalize” what voters are expressing on their ballots. With large ranges, voters will tend to crowd their scores around the endpoints and the midpoint. For example, given the range 0 to 99, the most common scores by far are 0, 1, 49, 50, 51, 98, and 99. A limited range is key to leveling the playing field and maximizing both the quantity and quality of information gathered.

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require that voters not give more than one candidate the same score

Most quality Condorcet methods allow voters rank candidates equally, so why would equal scores not be allowed?

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

Yeah, if you can express rank preference among candidates that you've given the same score, then a small score range is fine with me in the context of a smith//score method.

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[deleted]•

[deleted]

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BTernaryTau•

Personally I don't think passing the Smith criterion is necessary for a voting method to be good, but methods that do pass it seem to perform quite well in practice so I'm happy to support them.

Small rating scales are a concern, but it's important to keep in mind that most implementations of ranked ballots in the US limit voters to ranking 3-5 candidates. Even with only 6 ratings (0-5 is the smallest scale commonly proposed outside of approval voting), a rated ballot would do a better job than those implementations at collecting ordinal preferences.

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

Sure, I disagree with limiting how many candidates you can rank. All of those ranked system are IRV as far as I know so it's a bit moot anyway.

What do you mean that they perform well "in practice"? It's not like we see Condorcet methods widely utilized in the real world.

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BTernaryTau•

It's not entirely moot since it does set a precident for how ranked ballots are formatted. That precident can of course be ignored, but you'll likely have to justify the decision to use more ballot space.

Sorry, I worded that badly. I meant that the Condorcet methods that seem to actually be advocated for consistently perform well in simulations.

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rb-j•

Bottom Two Runoff is the simplest to encode legislation concisely, unless you want to go with straight-ahead Condorcet language, but then you need a "completion method" in case there is a cycle (which has never happened in a governmental election).

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choco_pi•

The 'straight ahead' language is actually fine, with similarly concise language mentioning the desired 'cycle tiebreaker' behavior.

Implementation within the legislated specification is entirely the purview of election authorities/administrators. Law is directive, not algorithmic nor a formal academic proof; plurality voting laws do not include proof of that addition is commutative, instructions on how to add, or specify what brand pen must be used.

Better to have election law language be as concise plain English as possible, and also pass support for appropriate election heads to generate definitive manuals for election officials to follow. (As they do now)

This is how most law is conducted; even the most verbose 1000 page bills leave all the details to the executive, subject to the judicial. Specific and unambiguous is important, but formal isn't.

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rb-j•

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Here is Hare RCV (a.k.a. IRV):


All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:

(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall not be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.

(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.

(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "continuing candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been defeated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is defeated and all candidates begin as continuing candidates.

(4) In each round, every ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The candidate with fewest votes is defeated in the current round.

(5) The aforementioned instant runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, shall be repeated until only two candidates remain. The remaining candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes is elected.

(6) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.


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Here is Bottom-Two Runoff:


All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:

(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall not be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.

(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.

(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, an instant runoff retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The instant runoff retabulation shall be conducted in sequential rounds. A "continuing candidate" is defined as a candidate that has not been defeated in any previous round. Initially, no candidate is defeated and all candidates begin as continuing candidates.

(4) In each round, every ballot shall count as a single vote for whichever continuing candidate the voter has ranked highest. The two candidates with the fewest votes in a round, herein denoted as "A" and "B", shall contend in a runoff in which the candidate, A or B, with lesser voter support shall be defeated in the current round. If the number of ballots ranking A higher than B exceeds the number of ballots ranking B higher than A, then B has lesser voter support, B is defeated, and A continues to the following round. Likewise, if the number of ballots ranking B higher than A exceeds the number of ballots ranking A higher than B, then A has lesser voter support, A is defeated, and B continues to the following round. In the case that the aforementioned measures of voter support of A and B are tied, then the candidate with fewest votes is defeated in the current round.

(5) The aforementioned instant runoff retabulation, eliminating one candidate each round, shall be repeated until only two candidates remain. The remaining candidate then receiving the greatest number of votes is elected.

(6) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.


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Here is straight-ahead Condorcet (version 1):


All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:

(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.

(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.

(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The candidate, who is the Condorcet winner, is elected if the rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate defeats, with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate when compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected candidate defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of ballots marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other candidate exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.

(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (3), then the candidate with the plurality of first preferences is elected.

(5) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.


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Here is another straight-ahead Condorcet (version 2):


All elections of [office] shall be by ballot, using a system of ranked-choice voting without a separate runoff election. The presiding election officer shall implement a ranked-choice voting protocol according to these guidelines:

(1) The ballot shall give voters the option of ranking candidates in order of preference. Lower ordinal preference shall be considered higher rank and the candidate marked as first preference is considered ranked highest. Equal ranking of candidates shall be allowed. Any candidate not marked with a preference shall be considered as ranked lower than every candidate marked with a preference.

(2) If a candidate receives a majority (over 50 percent) of first preferences, that candidate is elected.

(3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding election officer. The retabulation shall examine every possible pairing of candidates. Given N as the number of candidates, then the number of possible pairings of candidates is N(N-1)/2. For each possible pairing of candidates, if the number of ballots marked ranking a selected candidate over the other candidate is fewer than the number of ballots marked to the contrary, then the selected candidate is designated as defeated. After all candidate pairs are examined, the candidate who remains not designated as defeated is the Condorcet winner and is elected.

(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in step (3), then the candidate having the plurality of first preferences is elected.

(5) The [governing jurisdiction] may adopt additional regulations consistent with this subsection to implement these standards.


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rb-j•

Score is shitty and requires voters to vote tactically whenever there are 3 or more candidates.

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BTernaryTau•

No, score performs quite well when there are 3 or more candidates, including when voters vote tactically. Not to mention that there are other rated methods that can discourage tactical voting such as STAR, 3-2-1, and of course Smith//Score.

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rb-j•

You're ignoring what I said.

When there are 3 or more candidates on the ballot, every voter must decide how much they will score their second choice. That decision is inherently tactical.

This is also a problem for Approval Voting. When there are 3 or more candidates on the ballot, every voter must decide whether their political interests are best served by Approving their second choice or not. That decision is inherently tactical.

Score and Approval are both cardinal methods (differing only in the number of scoring levels provided) and that is the source of the inherent burden of tactical voting.

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BTernaryTau•

You're ignoring what I said.

How in the world did you come to that conclusion?

When there are 3 or more candidates, every voter must decide how much they will score their second choice. That decision is inherently tactical.

People have approximately cardinal preferences, not approximately ordinal preferences. Thus it is entirely possible to cast an honest rated ballot. All you need to do is normalize your preferences such that your most preferred candidate has the highest rating and your least preferred the lowest rating, then round to the nearest rating for each of the other candidates.

As an example, say I like A a lot better than B, and I like B somewhat better than C. Specifically, my preference between A and B is roughly 3 times as strong as my preference between B and C (you could represent this as A>>>B>C). If I'm rating on a 0-5 scale, I find that after normalizing my score for B is 1.25, which rounds to 1. Therefore, my honest rated ballot is A/5, B/1, C/0.

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Nintron711•

I believe the STAR voting method produces condorcet winners more than any other method. Correct me if I’m wrong.

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

Well Condorcet voting methods guarantee you find one when there is one, & STAR doesn't, so it's not the best at that metric

If you like STAR, then my suggestion would be Smith//STAR which would find the Smith set then use to pick the winner among the Smith set. If there is a Condorcet winner then the Condorcet winner will be the only member of the Smith set & will auto win. If the Smith set has more than one candidate then the candidates in the Smith set are in a Condorcet cycle & need some other method (such as STAR) to choose between them.

You can do a smith compliant version of any non Smith compliant method. There's Smith//IRV, Smith//approval, Smith//borda, & so on. Personally I would be satisfied with any Smith compliant system, although Smith//plurality would be pushing it lol.

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Nintron711•

Interesting I’ll have to look into smith, as far as star though from my understanding it is one of the best voting methods for selecting a condorcet winner especially over methods like ranked choice. That being said obviously nothing beats a full on massive ballot that has every match up, unfortunately though that’s likely not possible as everyone would faint looking at that.

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

You don't need voters to individually vote on each pairwise match. You just get a ranking & deduce each pairwise match preference from it. You can also leave some candidates unranked if you choose & unranked candidates are considered to lose their match with any ranked candidate for a given ballot.

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Nintron711•

Yeah but the issue is when you run into ties, or no apparent winner. After this you just stalemate…

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rb-j•

Occasionally an election will not have a condorcet winner because you get a scenario where voters as a group preferred A to be, & preferred B to C, but also preferred C to A.

So far, there hasn't been a single RCV election where this Rock-Paper-Scissors cycle has occurred. There has always been a Condorcet winner.

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

Yes, I think it's very unlikely to happen in realistic elections, especially when you have the major party - minor party dynamic we currently have. If you have a situation where no party has more than 20% support of voters than it"s a little more likely.

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choco_pi•

Yes and no. There are 4 requirements for a results cycle to manifest: (Beyond obviously having 3+ serious candidates in the first place)

  • The preference space must be at least 2-dimensional.
  • The population must not be evenly distributed in that space, but spread about across the multiple dimensions in some uneven radial symmetry.
    • So instead of an even disc, think blades of a fan. That specific type of uneven-ness.
  • The candidates themselves must be askew of this uneven distribution.
    • In other words, they have to all be on the leading edges of the fan blades, or all be on the trailing edges. If they are "centered" on the fan blades (like one might expect of a political leader), the effect is null.
  • The combined magnitude of these criteria must exceed the magnitude of the strongest candidate's ordinary positional advantage.

We have never observed this in a real world public election, and I suspect that they would be even more rare than normally-distributed spatial models suggest for multiple reasons. To keep it short, it's unnatural for political figures to emerge disjointed from dense bases of support at all, much less in a radial pattern.

My personal simulator gives an 8-dimensional election a 1.5% chance at a cycle with 3 viable candidates, 4.2% chance with 5, and 7.0% with 10. I think that that for the real world (in which candidates are not randomly distributed in ignorance of voter clusters!), these probabilities are off by an order of magnitude.

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psephomancy•
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choco_pi•

My calculations a month ago overlooked a key dynamic, which many others have as well.

The existence of a cycle is not based on the average occurrence of a particular incident, but the (extreme) dominance between two countervailing incidents. (Clockwise vs. counter-clockwise)

In D&D terms, the odds of rolling a 20 on a d20 is 5%. Whether you roll once or a million times, the average number of 20s is expected to be 5%.

But what if we were measuring the number of times you got a 20, minus the number of times you rolled a 1? (Specifically the absolute value; more 1s than 20s also counts.) The odds of this are not 0--with a small enough number of rolls and enough luck you might just roll only 1s or only 20s--but it converges to 0 the more you roll.

In other words, unlike most things we talk about in voting theory, occurrence of Condorcet cycles scales (inversely) with voter count. This is intuitive--3 candidates with 3 voters (who aren't themselves) would form a cycle relatively frequently in a multi-dimensional space!

But at even just 10,000 voters, the odds of a cycle among normally distributed (2D) voters is on the order of 0.01% with 3-8 candidates.

Of course, as the preference space flattens or expands, this decreases further; symmetrical 2D is the worst-case maxima for cycles to exist.

These factors help realign our thinking with observable reality, where cycles just plain don't exist.

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rb-j•

Besides needing at least 3 roughly equally-sized factions, there would have to be some "schizoid" collective reasoning. Sorta like "If I can't have Ralph Nader, then my second choice is for George W. Bush!"

A cycle is extremely unlikely to happen, but it can happen and the law needs to be prepared for such a situation.

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choco_pi•

Right on all counts.

Charles Dodgson (aka Lewis Carroll) was one of many who discovered and pondered about the possibility of a cycle. In his view, a group discovering a cyclical preference between choices would be such a groundbreaking and novel event that they should immediately pause and deliberate on this finding at length. (Before voting again)

While we can't always afford to hold endless tiebreaker repeat elections, at the very least we should publicize from the rooftops that such a crazy and unexpected outcome has occured. Surely such a shocking event would cause a political realignment of some kind, as parties/candidates seek to capitalize and move to "centered" positions. (That would attract more voters and nullify the cycle.)

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SentOverByRedRoverOP•

Well right, that's if politics is viewed in a one dimensional way, when ch many voters have been trained to do because of the two party system.

I think long term with a Condorcet voting method you'll get a lot more smaller parties that will be distinguished from each other on multiple dimensions, & voters will act accordingly, which might lead to cycles becoming more likely.

But again, I think it would still be a once in a blue moon sort of thing.

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psephomancy•

So far, there hasn't been a single RCV election where this Rock-Paper-Scissors cycle has occurred. There has always been a Condorcet winner.

They happen about 9% of the time:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox#Empirical_studies

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WikiSummarizerBot•

Condorcet paradox

Empirical studies

Many attempts have been made at finding empirical examples of the paradox. A summary of 37 individual studies, covering a total of 265 real-world elections, large and small, found 25 instances of a Condorcet paradox, for a total likelihood of 9. 4%: 325  (and this may be a high estimate, since cases of the paradox are more likely to be reported on than cases without). : 47  On the other hand, the empirical identification of a Condorcet paradox presupposes extensive data on the decision-makers' preferences over all alternatives—something that is only very rarely available.

^([ )^(F.A.Q)^( | )^(Opt Out)^( | )^(Opt Out Of Subreddit)^( | )^(GitHub)^( ] Downvote to remove | v1.5)

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rb-j•

There has not been a single RCV election in the United States in which there was a cycle. Not one.

"Studies have shown..."

So what you get to do is come up with some hard evidence of a single governmental election in the U.S. that had a cycle.

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psephomancy•

The United States isn't much of a democracy, though. That's like FairVote saying "RCV elected the Condorcet winner in 99% of US elections!!" while ignoring the fact that those only ever had one or two strong candidates and any voting system would have done so.

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rb-j•

No, it's not like

FairVote saying "RCV elected the Condorcet winner in 99% of US elections!!" while ignoring the fact that those only ever had one or two strong candidates and any voting system would have done so.

It's not like that at all.

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rb-j•

They happen about 9% of the time:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox#Empirical_studies

No they don't. What you need to do is track down the sources of some of these partisan claims made in Wikipedia and read the source article.

The source article only cites other articles as its basis of fact, never cites a single governmental election on either side of either pond that ever had a cycle. The source mentions things like

... elections held by professional organizations, unions and non-profit entities.

Not governmental elections, and yet...

They did not find an instance of Condorcet’s paradox.

You gotta read your sources so that you don't sound like a partisan pushing fake evidence.

Think about it probabilistically; with the 440 U.S. elections that FairVote claims that they confirmed that all had a Condorcet Winner and all but one elected that CW, if that 9% figure was accurate, the expected value of the number of elections having a cycle would be 40. Even if you include only the RCV election that had 3 or more candidates (I am told it's 172, but I haven't seen that research yet), the expectation value is 15.

Flip a coin 20 times, the expectation of the number of heads is 10. It's not likely to be exactly 10, but the likelihood of the number of heads being zero is 1 outa a million.

If the frequency of cycles was 9%, we would have seen a dozen of them, at least a couple of them in the United States and we have seen zero. So u/psephomancy, your citation is shit. And your unqualified claim is shit.

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psephomancy•

if that 9% figure was accurate, the expected value of the number of elections having a cycle would be 40.

No, it isn't, because the US uses FPTP, which leads to a two-party system, so there are only one or two strong candidates per election. Candidates know they shouldn't run and act as a spoilers, voters know they shouldn't vote honestly and waste their vote. So there will almost always be a Condorcet winner, and that winner will almost always be selected by any voting method (even FPTP).

But the goal of adopting better voting systems is to produce a multi-party system in which candidates can run without acting as spoilers (more like the non-governmental elections mentioned). In those types of elections, Condorcet cycles are more likely to occur.

So the statements

  • "RCV always elects the Condorcet winner, we don't need a real Condorcet method, look at US elections"
  • "Condorcet cycles don't occur, look at US elections"

are both bad arguments for the same reason: Current US elections are not representative of how things will be after adoption of those systems.

10% isn't much, but it's a realistic scenario that can happen whenever political opinion is multi-dimensional (which, again, it will be after you've broken the one-dimensional two-party system).

Instead of "Condorcet cycles aren't real, don't worry about them", the messaging should be something like: "Most of the time, our voting system elects the candidate who would beat every other candidate in a round-robin tournament. In a small number of elections (probably less than 10%), there is no such winner because of a circular tie, so our system breaks that tie using $COMPLICATED_METHOD because of $GOOD_REASONS."

This is better because a round-robin tournament is easy for most people to understand, and applies in >90% of cases, without having to go into "Let d[V, W] be the number of voters who prefer candidate V to candidate W..." or "Sort (rank) each pair, by the largest strength of victory first to smallest last..." computation details that will sink the campaign immediately. Those details are relegated to tie-breaking, which people accept as a necessary (and sometimes complicated) thing that's only needed rarely.

your citation is shit. And your unqualified claim is shit.

I think highly of you, and want Condorcet to succeed in Burlington, but it's not going to happen if this is how you interact with everyone you disagree with.

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rb-j•

the US uses FPTP, which leads to a two-party system, so there are only one or two strong candidates per election.

You need to show, mathematically, how that enters into the calculation.

For me it's simple: 0.09 × 440 ≈ 40.

Or if you use only the RCV elections with 3 or more candidates: 0.09 × 172 ≈ 15 .

But what we see is 0.

Candidates know they shouldn't run and act as a spoilers, voters know they shouldn't vote honestly and waste their vote. So there will almost always be a Condorcet winner, and that winner will almost always be selected by any voting method (even FPTP).

But you don't know with FPTP, because you don't collect enough data from voters with the ballot. All you know is that the candidate elected had more votes than any other.

The 9% estimation is an exceedly inaccurate value and for it to be promoted as fact by anyone is demonstrative of disingenuity. It's a bogus number supported by no actual citations of governmental elections that could actually identify the Condorcet winner. Somehow, to make the claim stick, you have to show evidence of governental election data with candidate rankings on every ballot and from that determine who the Condorcet winner is.

So far, we know of no governmental election on either side of either pond that has ballot data proving that a cycle occurred. But we know of at least one governmental election in which the CW was not elected.

That 9% figure is crap. Promoting it as "knowledge" is disingenuous because there just is no evidence of it in the context of the disagreement.

https://dilbert.com/strip/2008-05-08

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