Source
r/DebateReligion•
[deleted]

To All (especially hammiesink): A Primer on Dispositional Essentialism

Hi everybody. Name's Dave.

I'm sure all of you are familiar with hammiesink, and he often brings up a very good point that I'd like to address with some detail. Consider the following:

  1. Act and potency
  2. Just act
  3. Just potency

Number 1 is Aristotle. Number 2 is Parmenides. Number 3 is incoherent and impossible.

Is hammiesink correct in suggesting that all possibilities are exhausted?

I feel his commentary is mistaken. I am here again to make the case for dispositional essentialism, which satisfies the third option at the fundamental level. To do so, I will be referencing Alexander Bird's book Nature's Metaphysics (here's a review) and other various essays by scientific essentialists such as Brian David Ellis, Michael Esfeld, and E.J. Lowe.

WHAT IS DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM/MONISM?

Dispositional essentialism, when applied to a particular property, says that the property has a dispositional essence. A contrasting claim is that the property is categorical (p44).

And further:

Properties with dispositional essences I shall call potencies. Dispositional monism [a specific type of dispositional essentialism] is the claim that potencies exist and that the fundamental natural properties are potencies.

Specifically, dispositional essentialism (DE) is the theory that:

  1. All fundamental properties are potencies - there are no (fundamental) categorical natural properties.

  2. The laws of nature are consequences of the existence of potencies.

  3. The laws of nature are necessary.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Dispositional essentialism suggests that in all possible wolds, any object that possesses P is disposed to yield M in response to S. That is represented as the following:

(DEp) ... □(Px→D(S,M)x).

And, also, this is a conditional analysis (CA), which is nothing but a logical equivalence:

(CA□) ... □(D(S,M)x ↔ Sx □→Mx)

LOGICAL PROOF

Let P be a potency, i.e. some property with a dispositional essence, as in (DEp) above. Combine (DEp) with (CA□) and we have:

(I) ... □(Px→(Sx□→Mx)).

Let x acquire the stimulus S, i.e.

(II) ... Px&Sx

By (I) and (II) we have:

(III) ... Mx

Discharging (II) we have:

(IV) ... (Px&Sx)→Mx.

Since x is arbitrary we may generalize:

(V) ... ∀x((Px&Sx) →Mx

Since (V) holds in an arbitrary world w it is necessary:

(V□) ... □(∀x((Px&Sx) →Mx)

Which yields the conclusion:

(PNL) At least some of the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary.

This is the partial necessitation conclusion, and further work is needed to get to the strong necessitation stance, but this is sufficient for my purposes here and now.

WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH GOD?

Our beloved St. Thomas Aquinas argues the following:

The first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. (ST I.q3.a1)

If this conclusion (DE) should hold -- that only potencies exist which give rise to necessary laws of nature -- then it can be said with 100% metaphysical certainty that God, as previously defined, does not exist.

Please ask me anything related to this subject, no matter how broad or specific. I will do my best to research and answer to the greatest extent of my knowledge.

Peace,

D

Posted Mar 16, 2012, 1:00 AM UTC · edited

15144
weird_sex_thingsatheist•

Why should I accept that these concepts of "act" and "potency" are meaningful ways to describe the world?

13
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Edit: Because it is the best approach to answer these questions.

  • What is existence, i.e. what does it mean for a being to be?
  • Is existence a property?
  • Is existence a genus or general class that is simply divided up by specific differences?
  • Which entities, if any, are fundamental? Are all entities objects?
  • How do the properties of an object relate to the object itself?
  • What features are the essential, as opposed to merely accidental attributes of a given object?
  • How many levels of existence or ontological levels are there? And what constitutes a 'level'?
  • What is a physical object?
  • Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists?
  • Can one give an account of what it means to say that a non-physical entity exists?
  • What constitutes the identity of an object?
  • When does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing?
  • Do beings exist other than in the modes of objectivity and subjectivity, i.e. is the subject/object split of modern philosophy inevitable?

When Aristotle undertook to explain how it is that things change, a fact apparent to anyone, he had first to confront the seemingly iron-clad logic of Parmenides. Bound by this logic, Parmenides had been forced to the position that there is in reality no change at all. All change is mere appearance; reality is One, and this One, which only is, is unchanging.

He was forced to this position because, as he understood the terms of the problem, change is logically not possible. Not having the notion of potency, Parmenides had argued that there are only two alternatives for anything, being and non-being. No new being can come from non-being since "nothing comes from nothing." Nor can new being come from being since what has being, already is and does not begin to be: "being cannot come from being since it is already." (Source)

TL;DR The Problem of Change

6
weird_sex_thingsatheist•

Sounds like this is just metaphysical nonsense with no basis in physical reality. A marble block isn't "endowed with the capability to be transformed." It's just a block of marble. The "capability of being transformed" seems to just be shorthand for describing some set of concepts we have about the world, not denoting some real property of an object.

8
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Sounds like this is just metaphysical nonsense with no basis in physical reality.

Metaphysics is the basis for physical reality. ಠ_ಠ

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weird_sex_thingsatheist•

Oh, sorry. I didn't mean to imply that all metaphysics was nonsense- just this concept. As in, "this is just making stuff up and it doesn't represent anything real."

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[deleted]•

[deleted]

1
tannatwe're here•

Edit: Because it is the best approach to answer these questions.

Isn't this mostly due to our inability to visualize the simplicity of dynamic systems (changing systems, motion) without differential math? We just throw in all random dynamic variables, together with being, into a metaphysical transfer function and then we can continue to discuss metaphysical states as if change and motion is something that is portioned out and sustained.

Question is what answers act/potency can provide when being a such high level metaphysical construct. It would seem reasonable to try to detail different types of change, rather than presupposing the generalized transfer function of actualization from potency to act to hold relevance, mixing being with motion, potency and act, as it does, to a tincture of metaphysical and physical variables.

1
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

We just throw in all random dynamic variables, together with being, into a metaphysical transfer function and then we can continue to discuss metaphysical states as if change and motion is something that is portioned out and sustained.

What is being? The strict scientist cannot answer this question. He faces the problem of change and cannot overcome it without accepting an Aristotelian explanation.

It would seem reasonable to try to detail different types of change

That's exactly what DE is doing. It's a refutation of the regularity theory and a neo-Aristotelian explanation of ontological problems.

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timoumdAgnostic Atheist•

This. 100x this.

1
hammiesink•

Sorry. This is over my head. I would have to read all of this literature to even begin to form a coherent response.

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

OK, in the mean time, I will work with you instead of against you (where possible) in correcting the misconceptions of the more militantly-minded of this group. :)

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hammiesink•

Thanks!

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tannatwe're here•
  1. Act and potency
  2. Just act
  3. Just potency

these exhaust all possible metaphysical options for what kind of "stuff" exists in the Universe.

Why at all try to impregnate descriptions of static "stuff" with dynamic variables? Or express dynamic variables through items?

Act/potency seems to be a convenience rather than an feasible solution, it seems to be disjunct from the physical world. In a world were motion really is described by a difference between static states of items, without differentiation, distances between two objects will also, necessarily, be described by the nature of the objects, not their relative position.

The act potency description seems to be an extremely artificial model. I can't see how it can claim relevancy.

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Act/potency seems to be a convenience rather than an feasible solution, it seems to be disjunct from the physical world

But what to do mean by physical world? Surely you mean a world of actually existing things. What does it mean to be actual? Can potencies be actual, or are they defined as purely non-actual? These are the questions that philosophy of science tries to answer, and presently DE has the best theory to do so.

1
dasbushCatholic | Thomist•

What is a dispositional essence? And how do properties have them? Can a property have an essence in the first place? I just don't know your terminology and the framework of your thought and so I can't comment on your argument per se. I'll grant that the logic is sound, but I can neither make heads nor tails of your premises.

Is it the case that □(∀x((Px&Sx) →Mx)? It is logically sound, but what kinds of things are P and S and M so as to convince me that this is a true implication? Furthermore, it seems like you loaded your conclusion since you started with a necessity "□(Px→(Sx□→Mx))" then of course you end with necessity (since you did not use any possibility). So why should I believe that this is the case?

As an aside, it seems to me that if the laws of nature are logically necessary and metaphysical naturalism is true (ie: no extra-material being) then isn't it the case that this is the only possible world? For what can constitute a difference between worlds if the laws of nature are necessary and they govern everything? It seems, further, that this world is merely a machine churning out its cogs and we are utterly bound to it with no hope of escape.

So we have

  1. Laws of nature are necessary -> no freedom
  2. Laws of nature are necessary
  3. Therefore no freedom

On the other hand

  1. Laws of nature are necessary -> no freedom
  2. Freedom
  3. Therefore the laws of nature are not necessary.

One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

What is a dispositional essence? And how do properties have them?

An essence is what is is to be something. To be a property, then, requires that said property has a fundamental essence or nature. What exactly is this nature? This fundamental nature is said to be purely dispositional, meaning that it is a potency.

It is strictly the existence of potencies (fundamentally pure dispositions) that gives rise to properties. Properties necessarily have them because to lack them would to not have an essence, to not be a property to begin with. To be is to be something in particular.

Can a property have an essence in the first place?

Yes, properties necessarily have dispositional essences.

It is logically sound, but what kinds of things are P and S and M so as to convince me that this is a true implication?

A property (such as "electric charge") has as its essence a disposition D to manifest M (e.g. "to repel") under stimulus S (e.g. "influence of another like charge").

Furthermore, it seems like you loaded your conclusion since you started with a necessity "□(Px→(Sx□→Mx))" then of course you end with necessity

Correct, and I think that is the point. That is implicit in what it is meant by 'dispositional essence'... a necessity to manifest M under stimulus S.

However, consider the following:

"Dispositions are modal properties. A disposition such as fragility is generally characterized by a counterfactual conditional such as ‘If x were struck, x would break’. Moreover, objects possess many dispositions without manifesting them (any fragile but unbroken glass will serve as an example); the manifestation of such a disposition is merely possible."

There is the possibility factor you may be looking for. However, fundamentally pure dispositions (i.e. charge, mass, angular momentum ... as opposed to something like fragility) must necessarily manifest. Fragility is not a fundamental disposition.

As an aside, it seems to me that if the laws of nature are logically necessary and metaphysical naturalism is true (ie: no extra-material being) then isn't it the case that this is the only possible world?

Perhaps, I'm not certain. If other worlds exist, they would have different laws of nature entirely and would bear no resemblance to our own world. Bear in mind that when discussing "possible worlds" it is merely a modal tool to exhaust all possibilities. Alternatively, one might be so Panglossian as to say that this is the best of allpossible worlds!

It seems, further, that this world is merely a machine churning out its cogs and we are utterly bound to it with no hope of escape.

I do not think that follows. DE does not mean hard determinism is true. I am personally inclined to accept indeterminism and possibly a two-stage model of free will.

5
dasbushCatholic | Thomist•

If other worlds exist, they would have different laws of nature entirely and would bear no resemblance to our own world.

We need not speak of other worlds existing concretely, but only in respect to logical possibility. What I mean is that if the laws of nature are necessary, then it is logically impossible for them to be false. In other words, they are true in all possible worlds. As such, all possible worlds must have them and therefore I do not see how any possible world would be different than this one given metaphysical naturalism which entails that there is nothing unconstrained by the laws of nature. Therefore, there is only one possible world.

I think that I have one more question to understand, to an extent, of what you're saying. What is your view of substances? It seems to me that properties are taking the traditional role of substances on your theory. Properties are disposed to exhibit certain characteristics given various stimuli. The property 'fragility' exhibits brokenness when struck but to me I don't see how 'fragility' itself exhibits brokenness, but the substance which has the property of fragility acquires the property brokenness.

So it sounds to me like a bundle theory of substance, where a thing is the sum of its properties or, more properly, the set of all its properties. I find this theory somewhat incoherent, but that is irrelevant for now since I merely seek to understand at this moment.

To go further, an electron must have the property "charge negative." So I would agree that given the laws of nature, some properties must be necessarily had by certain things. But I think it might be a leap to say that the laws of nature are therefore necessary (or at least it is not instantly apparent to me). Furthermore, necessary, of course, has various meanings. There is necessity of being and logical necessity. I am not sure exactly which this theory fits into, but given what I have said I suspect that it is the latter.

Another issue that may rear its head is the nature of the existence of properties, and this is related to the question of substance. Do properties exist in themselves or only in other things. The first would be a somewhat Platonist view. "Red" exists in itself and other things participate in some way in redness, while the latter merely states that red exists in many things. As such, when I hear that properties have essences, I think the first since an essence is "what it is to be something." So that means that properties are something, they are substances. Now, there may be distinction between various properties in this sense, some having essences and some not and I'm not sure how that would cash out immediately.

Moving on, properties necessarily manifest some thing given stimulus, but some properties, it seems to me, do not require stimulus to manifest that thing (electrical charge, for example). Thus fragility requires something to happen for it to manifest brokenness, while "charge negative" does not require stimulus to manifest "negativeness." Indeed, it is tautological that "charge negative" is negative. So there isn't really any implication, but merely a truth of the nature of negative charges. My question then is "what's the point?"

I'll try to summarize:

If properties have essences, then is it not the case that they have concrete existence as substances?

Do things exist in themselves or are they merely the set of their properties?

Why must the laws of nature be necessary?

Is it the case that not all properties necessarily entail something else? Fragility necessarily entails that the thing can be broken, but "red" does not seem to entail anything given stimulus.

We'll go from there I guess - I probably wont respond for a few days, as a note.

1
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Therefore, there is only one possible world.

This may well be true, but we must be careful in then understanding "world" as "our observable universe"... I will leave it there and say that I do not know for certain.

The property 'fragility' exhibits brokenness when struck but to me I don't see how 'fragility' itself exhibits brokenness, but the substance which has the property of fragility acquires the property brokenness.

This may help understand how we identify things in accordance with their essences:

For example, tigers are tigers in virtue of possessing a particular set of genetic properties, but identifying (or appearance-based) properties are nonessential properties. If a tiger lost a leg, or didn't possess stripes, we would still call it a tiger. They are not necessary for being a member of the class of tigers.

It is important, however, that the set of essential properties of an object not be used to identify or be identified with that object because they are not necessary and sufficient, but only necessary. Having such and such a genetic code does not suffice for being a tiger. We wouldn't call a piece of tiger fur a tiger, even though a piece of tiger fur contains the genetic information essential to being a tiger.

I hope that makes sense.

What is your view of substances? It seems to me that properties are taking the traditional role of substances on your theory

Dispositional properties give rise to structure through spatio-temporal relations.

So it sounds to me like a bundle theory of substance, where a thing is the sum of its properties or, more properly, the set of all its properties.

No, this is not a bundle theory. An essence can't be "divided up into smaller constituent properties", it is rather a unified entity. An essence is furthermore not "reducible" in any sense - it is said to be "fundamentally pure".

There is necessity of being and logical necessity. I am not sure exactly which this theory fits into, but given what I have said I suspect that it is the latter.

Both. That is the point. Since it is grounded in essences, logical necessity gives rise to necessity of being.

So I would agree that given the laws of nature, some properties must be necessarily had by certain things.

This is not by tautology, as you imply. This is not analytic a priori, this is synthetic a posteriori. See: Saul Kripke

So that means that properties are something, they are substances.

Or, that something is a potency; they are dispositions.

while "charge negative" does not require stimulus to manifest "negativeness."

Yes it does. The property is the disposition to repel when influenced by a like-charge. Stimuli need not be external, and this is probably where I differ most from Thomists.

2
dasbushCatholic | Thomist•

This may well be true, but we must be careful in then understanding "world" as "our observable universe"... I will leave it there and say that I do not know for certain.

For our purposes, that definition suffices. But there are many possible worlds, worlds which could look very different from our own. Any contingent proposition is true in one world and false in another, for example. Any contingently held property (my wearing a hat, for example) is true in one world and false in another. So too, it is true in many worlds and false in many others. So there is a possible world which has everything the same as this world, except that I am not wearing a hat at time=t. In this sense, I have argued that there are no other possible worlds if the laws of nature are necessary and if naturalism is true. Since they are not contingent, they cannot be different in any other world and since there is no extramaterial reality which can escape being governed by the laws of nature then it must be the case that this is the only possible world. Anyway, there's a lot to be said about possible worlds, and it is entirely inconsequential to our point, except in that I might convince you that the laws of nature are not necessary, since any hope of freedom must then be false. Moving on.

Dispositional properties give rise to structure through spatio-temporal relations.

How are they related? Is there something which unifies them (a form, to use Aristotelian/Thomistic terminology) or are they just "clumped together" (hence my thinking it is a bundle theory). Do you see my confusion on this point? Why are the things related? Is it simply because they are close together, meaning that if I were to take tiger DNA and throw enough matter at it then I would have a tiger (more or less)? That sounds like something similar to a bundle theory, so I've probably missed something. Would it be more like a bare-particular style view, where the essence is a bare substrate which properties "cling" to?

Since it is grounded in essences, logical necessity gives rise to necessity of being.

I don't know what this means. You'll have to explain it a little further. It may seem apparent to you, but it is not to me.

This is not analytic a priori, this is synthetic a posteriori.

The last thing we need to do here is bring up Kant!

something is a potency

How can something be potency? I know that was kind of the point of this post, to show that there could be pure potency. But you haven't really made it clear yet that this is possible, at least under my understanding of act/potency. A thing can have potencies/privations, but it cannot only be privation. It is a tautology to say that a thing which only has privations is no thing at all.

1
ghjmdissenting atheist•

Suppose we grant that only potencies exist which give rise to the laws of nature. Why should any actual particle exist? How does a collection of nothing but potencies add up to non-zero actual mass/energy?

3
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Potencies are also referred to as "ontological powers". They are often confused with, but are not "logical possibilities".

Here's a good paper on the matter: "The Ontology of Pure Dispositions" by William Bauer

The present thought is that fundamental properties give rise to structure due to spatio-temporal relations. Here's Alexander Bird's "Structural Properties Revisited", in which he argues that a background-free physical theory would work best.

2
ghjmdissenting atheist•

As far as I can tell, neither of these papers answers my question.

I'm going to provisionally dismiss this as absurd. Consider the following thought experiment: I hit you in the head with an actual rock and a potential rock. Which one hurts more?

1
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

I answered your question. ಠ_ಠ

You asked how they add up, and I responded that they give rise to structures (e.g. things with masses) due to spatio-temporal relations and interactions with each other. Hence, we have things like "electrons" - which do have mass.

Consider the following thought experiment: I hit you in the head with an actual rock and a potential rock. Which one hurts more?

Now you're just being condescending and dishonest. This is a straw man. I did not say "potential" (possibility), I said "potency" (power). A potential rock does not exist.

1
ghjmdissenting atheist•

If potencies are not potentialities, then in what sense is any of this a response to Thomism, as you claim in the OP?

You say you are responding to hammiesink: fine. But hammiesink puts in a tremendous amount of work explaining his position to the audience here. This subreddit is not populated with analytic philosophers. If you won't go to the effort of making yourself understood to the readership that actually exists here, then I think you're in a bit of a glass house when it comes to calling other people condescending.

1
GoodDamonIgnostic atheist|Physicalist|Blueberry muffin•

I know this is meant to challenge hammiesink, but as a materialist, I completely reject the act/potency formulation as little more than a medieval precursor to the scientific theory of potential energy. It was useful and insightful in its day, but its day is long since done.

3
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

I wouldn't be so certain about that.

Essentialism in academia is dominating the course of discussion now due to its great explanatory ability. Most philosophers of nature are either dispositionalists, essentialists, or both. Hume's old perspective has been thoroughly destroyed by new modern critiques.

At the same time, the Thomist-Aristotelian paradigm has been updated significantly, and these philosophers are now gladly calling themselves neo-Aristotelians.

2
GoodDamonIgnostic atheist|Physicalist|Blueberry muffin•

Perhaps that is true in modern theistic philosophy, but it's meaningless to me, because I consider both the antiquated version of act/potency and its modern derivatives to be poor interpretations of energy that introduce unnecessary complexity.

Allow me to demolish act/potency with one simple question: Is potency transitive? If the answer is yes, then everything has a real infinite chain of potentiality, rendering the concept meaningless. If the answer is no, then you have a real infinite chain of potentialities that must be passed through before achieving any specific actuality -- also rendering the concept meaningless. There are infinities waiting to get you at both ends.

2
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

To be clear, could you please clarify what you mean by transitive?

1
GoodDamonIgnostic atheist|Physicalist|Blueberry muffin•

Certainly. In logic, if A has a relationship to B and B has a relationship to C, then A has a relationship to C. For instance, if A=B and B=C, then A=C.

If potentiality is transitive, then it would be something like:

  1. A is potentially B.
  2. B is potentially C.
  3. Therefore, A is potentially C.
3
[deleted]•

but it's meaningless to me, because I consider both the antiquated version of act/potency and its modern derivatives to be poor interpretations of energy

Yeah, but that's not what they are.

Modern biology is meaningless to creationists, because they consider the fossil record to be a fabrication of the devil. Our response when people have ill-informed considerations like this is to encourage them to become informed.

1
GoodDamonIgnostic atheist|Physicalist|Blueberry muffin•

Yeah, but that's not what they are.

It certainly seems to be. Aristotle was trying to figure out why there is change, and some of the concept actually made it into science in the (heavily modified) form of the theory of potential energy.

1
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Perhaps that is true in modern theistic philosophy,

It's secular. Oderberg and Feser are the only obvious theists who I know that subscribe to essentialism. I'd venture to say a majority of them are atheists.

1
GoodDamonIgnostic atheist|Physicalist|Blueberry muffin•

I admit, I haven't looked for modern-day philosophers who aren't theists but subscribe to an Aristotelian viewpoint, since modern physics rejects it. I'll look into it more.

1
[deleted]•

I have been following the argument, and this is a digression, but do you belong to this blog?

http://www.blazingtruth.com/unmoved-mover/

http://www.blazingtruth.com/parmenides/#more-940

edited to add that either way, there were some interesting arguments on the blog.

1
Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

Properties with dispositional essences I shall call potencies ...

... naw, on second thought, I have myself a nice apple here, I shall call my apple potency.

I hear Aquinas also has a concept he calls potency.

Clearly he must be talking about my apple, since potency = potency, letter for letter. Let me check: P o t e n c y. Hmm, yea, so far so good.

Apples grow on trees (at least sometimes) that is easily shown: (insert a lot of pictures of apple trees)

Notice there are apples in the zoomed-in view.

And when I say apple, I obviously mean potency.

Since I have conclusively shown that potency can grow on trees, I'll now go on to expound on the consequences that has on Aquinas' reasoning.

2
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

If you don't have anything productive to say...

3
Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

Are you gonna make a case that Aquinas was talking about something equivalent to "properties with dispositional essences" when he referred to potency or are you not?

1
blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

No, I don't need to do that.

All I need to show is that Aquinas didn't exhaust all possibilities, such that DE is an acceptable theory. Then, if DE can prove that it is not possible for there to exist something of pure act, then that seals the deal.

2
Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

If you don't need to show that properties with dispositional essences are equivalent to Aquinas' potency, then you are not making the claim that they are the same concept. Correct?

Well then, let's call "DE potency" A, and "Aquinas potency" B.

If you are not claiming they are the same concept, how can your reasoning leading to "just A is coherent" possibly lead to your claim that "just B is coherent"? You have to establish the relationship between A and B.

How can your statements about DE potency be applicable to Aquinas' potency if you are not making the claim that they are, in fact, the same concept?

Is this such a hard point to grasp?

2
Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

then Aquinas’ conclusion is undermined as modal logic may indicate that potencies (as defined by DE) don’t require an external stimulus to initiate change.

and

As a cautionary note, this only comes provided that DE’s account of potency is the same as Aquinas’ concept of potency. I do not believe that to be the case.

Thank you! Also, good blog.

1
xatmatworkex-christian|pyrrhonian moral skeptic|methodological solipsist•

So in summary

The "potency" you discuss here is different from the "potency" Aquinas discussed. I have not outlined any arguments on how this is the case.

2
Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

I have not outlined any arguments on how this is the case.

Ah but I don't have to, he said, as I quoted,

Properties with dispositional essences I shall call potencies

then went on to apply the conclusions he arrived at to the concept of potency as used by Aquinas.

Unless it is shown that the "properties with dispositional essences" are equal to the concept of potency as used by Aquinas, his argument about "properties with dispositional essences" has just as much merit as mine about my apple (RIP).

Which is none.

2
xatmatworkex-christian|pyrrhonian moral skeptic|methodological solipsist•

This is the partial necessitation conclusion, and further work is needed to get to the strong necessitation stance, but this is sufficient for my purposes here and now.

As he said this is currently incomplete. If he reaches a strong necessitation stance and the below statement holds true:

If this conclusion (DE) should hold -- that only potencies exist which give rise to necessary laws of nature -- then it can be said with 100% metaphysical certainty that God, as previously defined, does not exist.

then his work is done.

What you need to make sure you understand is this:

  1. Act and potency
  2. Just act
  3. Just potency

Note that he is taking these statements that are already defined by Thomism. He is then taking the third, which Thomism traditionally calls "incoherent and impossible", and saying "actually I think it can exist, and this theory is called dispositional essentialism."

It is not like your apple analogy.

Here is what it is more like:

  • You make a theory that holds if apples can only be red and green. You adamantly state that apples cannot be blue, this is absurd.

  • I suggest that apples can be blue, so I make the two pronged approach of:

    a) If apples can be blue, your theory is incorrect.

    b) I am going to put forward a case for the possibility of apples being blue.

  • Then, someone comes along and says "What a stupid argument, the apples you are talking about are in no way related to the apples the OP was talking about."

Sorry if that wasn't clear, let me know if parts need clarifying.

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Thank you for understanding my intent. Scientific essentialism is not a complete theory, but it is the strongest approach to understanding ontology that exists today.

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Kawoombamod|non-religious simulationist•

Thanks for the effort, I just haven't seen the case being made that "properties with dispositional essences" are in fact equivalent to "potency" as used by Aquinas.

That has to be shown before you can conclude that something you can deduct about "properties with dispositional essences" applies to Aquinas' "potency" as well.

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BillWeld•

I understood no more than 20% of this but it looks interesting. Doesn't the difference between potential and actual involve time? And if time is a created thing, what then?

2
[deleted]•

(PNL) At least some of the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary.

Doesn't your derivation of the laws of nature takes as a premise that there is some Px? If so, these laws are only metaphysically necessary if it is metaphysically necessary that there is some Px. But you don't demonstrate this. Then PNL is unsupported.

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blazingtruthcatholic•

Doesn't your derivation of the laws of nature takes as a premise that there is some Px (properties)?

i. The world contains P (premise)

ii. If there are potencies, then laws supervene on them (premise)

iii. The best explanation of P is that there are potencies. (premise)

iv. There are potencies (from i. and iii.)

v. There are laws (from ii. and iv.)

You are questioning premise i., if I understand you correctly.

I do not think this is an argument which directly takes into account solipsism. I'm fairly certain DE would ultimately come to reject it.

If so, these laws are only metaphysically necessary if it is metaphysically necessary that there is some Px.

Bird spends a long time responding to Mumford about this point, or one similar. Mumford's stance is that there exists no such things as the laws of nature at all.

1
[deleted]•

You are questioning premise i., if I understand you correctly.

I'm saying your conclusion doesn't follow: you nowhere demonstrate PNL. Your "logical proof" seems simply to be making explicit a formulation of natural laws in terms of, and as analytically entailed in, your definition of a disposition. But that doesn't get us to PNL.

I do not think this is an argument which directly takes into account solipsism.

What does solipsism have to do with this?

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

and as analytically entailed in,

No, this is synthetic, not analytic. Therefore it is not tautological and your criticism doesn't apply.

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[deleted]•

In what sense is your deduction synthetic? And if it were, what significance would this have to the objection that your conclusion does not follow?

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Relevant to hammiesink, from your blog.

Just matter by itself without any form is called “prime matter”, and cannot exist as it is purely potential. However, like pure act, pure form can exist on its own.

And, perhaps along your leaning:

In a book-length treatment on the subject, Oderberg (2007) has proposed a substantial, traditionally Thomistic version of essentialism, where an object’s essence is given wholly by its kind, and the relation between this essence and an object’s matter is to be understood along Aristotelian-Thomistic, hylomorphistic lines as one between act and potency. Following Fine, Oderberg too suggests that possibility and necessity in general (even logical possibility and necessity) are ‘grounded in the natures of things’(Oderberg 2007: 126), while the possible existence of non-actual objects is grounded in prime matter, which is conceived as ‘pure potentiality’.

([Source] (http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/07/20/analys.anr077.full)) <-- a really helpful summary of theories out there.

Edit: It appears as if Kit Fine is the one to read up on. I've got some work to do...

1
Error302•

this kind of language continues to give me a headache, but i find this much more coherant than the sorts of things i've been reading lately on the topic lol.

cheers

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Thank you for your time and thought.

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[deleted]•

[deleted]

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moreLytesatheist|humanist|bayesian•

Your cited review appears to be hidden behind a paywall.

Thanks for posting, this is excellent content. For those interested, this SEP entry may help to provide further context.

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blazingtruthpreacher's kid | mystic •

Thanks, and sorry about that!

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[deleted]•

I have no real physics background and have done limited reading in the area personally, so this may not be very useful. And I already see strong reasons to reject act/potency, so this is more or less for the sake of curiosity more than because my believing it is contingent on whether there is an answer or not (just to be clear about my motivation) - but since everyone is on the subject - what would the following be (Act or potency)?

A vacuum?

Time?

also, Faber raised the concern that if action is not possible in a vacuum, than does that mean 'god' is not able to be in a vacuum (or similar anyhow). Was this addressed? (found online).

Thank you and sorry for the digression. Good thread!

1