Do nukes have a "undo" mechanism in case of accidental launch?
As in, if a nuke is launched and shortly after they regret it somehow, do they have a window of time to securely intercept it?
Posted Mar 18, 2022, 3:34 PM UTC
524
Can't put the toothpaste back in the tube.
4
First that system would be another potential point of failure. Second there is no guarantee that your enemy might may have acquired the codes somehow. Third there is no way to be assured that you can remain in contact with a launched missile throughout its flight, making this a very unreliable option. Fourth, why would you want such an ability? If you are not absolutely sure, you shouldn't be launching in the first place.
2
Well, anything being a potential point of failure cannot be a viable excuse not to build stuff, else we wouldn't have anything.
I don't get your second point about "enemy acquiring codes", my question has nothing to do with that.
Third, I didn't suppose there would be a mechanism that keeps in touch with the missile, I was thinking of this undo-mechanism as independent and target-seeking.
Fourth, because there has been quite a few incidents of accidents that could have end up in nukes being launched.
1
Some points of failure are more critical than others - the system under discussion must be fail-safe or it cannot be trusted, and system that cannot be trusted is worthless and therefore of no use.
There is no way a 'undo' command would be sent in the clear, some sort of authentication has to be part of the order sent to the missile - this could be compromised.
The notion of an onboard disarming mechanism that was not under ground command makes no sense whatsoever, it has no way to determine if it was launched in error. Nuclear warheads of all sort need arming before they can explode, it is my understanding that this is done as part of the launch sequence.
I do not know how deeply you have looked at these reported incidents of accidental unauthorised launches, but I did about five years ago. What I found was that the stories that have been told by those opposed to nuclear weapons can only charitably called exaggerations when compared to the actual incident reports, all of which are available for study.
1
The concern they're referring to is that if we had a way to wirelessly log into a missile in flight and deactivate it -- or however it is you're imagining the "undo" working -- then by definition the enemy would have a way to do it too, if they knew our codes. We don't want our nuclear force to be hacked and taken offline at the last minute.
The system that exists in the U.S., at least, is designed to ensure that a nuclear launch order that reaches the man or woman at the very end of the chain definitely is an authentic order that was passed down all the way from the president. It's designed to prevent an "accident" in the sense that we want to make sure someone halfway down doesn't get nervous, or get a prank phone call, or go crazy, or whatever. It's not designed to prevent a situation where the president gives the launch order, and then when the missiles are halfway there, goes, "Oh wow, I kind of wish I hadn't done that."
It seems reasonable to assume other nuclear powers work on a similar principle.
1
Nope. Because that would make them vulnerable to interference, which reduces their deterrence value. Once they leave the silo, it's fait accompli.
2
No. It's kind of the opposite of that.
2
Generally speaking, there's no control-Z on the launch console. Gotta wait for the next version.
1
Fuck no once they go they can't come back
1
No. It's why there's such a long line of steps to launch one. Once the launch happens you've gone through a couple hundred people to make it happen. If you didn't stop along the way you can't stop after.
Really? There's that many people involved in the decision? Even under dictatorships?
Even in the U.S., the decision rests pretty much solely on the President. Everybody else only gets to decide if they're going to follow the order. Secdef relays the order to the appropriate military commanders, and from there it's straight to the missile wing and the guys who have to turn the keys.
The process has to work fast, because it's designed to be able to function to completion, from the time we get warning of incoming strikes to launch in time to get ICBMs clear of their silos before incoming strikes eliminate them. The missile launch people are drilled to perform without question. They only have a few minutes to decide. - (Edit: I looked up some numbers below and fixed them).
Russia's system has to be similar, because we have SLBMs, too. So you can imagine how everybody below the command level in that chain is conditioned to believe that they don't have time to question, or hesitate.
If Putin were to order a first strike, of course he has time to think about it, and his cabinet has time to argue with him (if he doesn't have them purged first). But down the chain (which is only a couple layers deep, from the cabinet to the launch officers), it's unlikely anybody would waste time questioning the order.
Pretty good article about it here (and about what happens to you if you even voice the concern "but how would I know if was a legitimate order?"): http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2017/04/10/president-bomb-iii/
Also, neither Russia nor the U.S. has a "no-first-use" pledge. Just sayin' ...
Nice response. I think you explain this pretty well.
During a Presidential debate in 2016, Hillary Clinton said the US decision making window was something like 4 minutes.
Yeah, that's about right... could be a little less or a little more, depending on circumstances, but yeah. They can't waste ANY time.
Exactly the kind of answer I was looking for. Thank you
Hypersonics: if an adversary uses hypersonic weapons from a submarine, there's even less time for counter-response. Current nuclear ORBAT utilizes this class of weapon for "decapitation strike".
Putin has to meet with a few generals and politicians to agree, then they send those commands down the line until the soldiers manning the base get the orders to fire. Maybe not 100 but more than just a few.
Negative. The sub incident in the Cuban Missile Crisis only involved three people making the call.
Which sounds like a few to me.
If one hadn't disagreed, well, nukes would have flown. Not really a lot of takebacks after that point.
It just depends.
In the Cuba situation, there was no order from command, just a standing order about under what circumstances they were allowed to respond with nuclear torpedoes.
The sub was out of contact with the rest of the command structure. There WAS no chain of command for the moment. But yeah, Arkhipov saved all our butts that day.
Not wrong but not right.
In a first strike, where someone is going to order an attack then yes it has to go down chain of command to be launched.
In a retaliation it's very dependable on the situation. In an SLBM it would be up to the crew, if it was a land based silo then it would again follow the chain of command.
There are a few steps involved, but no where near 100 people.