LongForWisdom

Delegation has now been launched for the Maker Protocol. If you hold MKR and haven't been voting in the past, please give serious consideration to delegating your MKR to one or more of Maker's Recognised Delegates.

Ineffective or participation-starved governance will kill the Maker Protocol over the long-term just as surely as governance attacks will in the short term.

If you are holding capital in the MKR Token you should seriously consider delegating responsibly. The safest and lowest-effort way of doing this is to split your MKR across the Recognised Delegates. Alternatively, taking a little more time and determining which delegate you prefer is also advisable.

**Here are a coupl

Hullo all, if you hold MKR, please consider voting on the portal [here](https://vote.makerdao.com/polling).

A number of polls could use more MKR voting. In order for these proposals to be included, the Yes votes need to outweigh the no votes by at least 3000 MKR.
Protocol DAI Transfer
Domain Structure and Roles
Strategic Reserves

Additionally, these two are neck and neck

Recently we've not seen many individuals participating and voting in the MakerDAO forum. We've also seen less and less MKR active in on-chain voting. As a participant in both processes, I'd like to try to encourage current and potential MKR holders to take part in governance, both on and off-chain.

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Over the next few months, participation in the Maker community is going to be crucial as we prepare for the launch of MCD. There are so many open questions around the parameters and collateral types that MCD launches with and around the creation and ratification of community roles, risk teams and oracles. If nothing changes, the answers to these questions are going to be pro

There has been some discussion recently, mostly prompted by u/mrabino1 over the potential for problems surrounding the DSR and the Stability Rate calculation for MCD.

These are not simple concepts, so I think it would be useful for Governance to generate a problem definition that we can get consensus on, or at least, that no one actively objects to.

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Current System

With that in mind, here is the relevant information on the currently proposed system. Please correct me if I am mistaken with these statements:

• Collateral Package: A combination of a collateral type, along with attached values for the Risk Premium, Collateralization Ratio and the Debt Ceiling. There wil

I've also been considering the issues u/mrabino1 raised in this weeks governance meeting and I'd like to share my thoughts on them. I found it a little difficult to follow the points Matthew was making, so I've tried to lay out the problem more clearly with examples, and suggested what I believe is the best solution. Apologies, Matthew, if I misunderstood the thrust of your argument.

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The Problem

We have two collateral assets, the first: 'RiskCoin' with a Risk Premium of 20% (representing something very risky) and the second 'SafeCoin' with a Risk Premium of 2% (representing something very safe.) The systems global DSR setting is currently at 1%, but we want to increase i

Firm Assumptions (95% confidence)

Keeping the Dai peg is the primary goal of all MKR holders, if we keep the peg, MKR appreciates. Stability is everything. If we cant keep Dai stable, MKR will become worthless.

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Market Makers are essential to keeping the peg, as MKR holders, we need actors willing to take this role and trade dai around the peg. The more people or organisations that do this, the easier it is for the system as a whole to absorb shocks to supply and demand.

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Long-term appreciation of the MKR token requires the peg to be maintained, all other concerns are secondary to this. This includes:

• The unfortunate CDP holders who took out loans at low r