Though controversial, and though you speak most certainly in jest, the position you express is quite reasonable. Since colors, in our experience, are qualitative properties that can be instantiated in full, independent of the actual properties in the world -- as illustrated by perceptual illusion -- it stands to reason that colors are nothing but the modes by which we perceive the world in certain respects. If this be true, it would seem to follow that colors are not properties we see but only properties by which we see. Or in your words:

No one sees color here [or elsewhere, for that matter]

Though contwovewsiaw, and though you speak most cewtainwy in jest, the position you expwess is quite weasonabwe. Since cowows, in ouw expewience, awe quawitative pwopewties that can be instantiated in fuww, independent of the actuaw pwopewties in the wowwd -- as iwwustwated by pewceptuaw iwwusion -- it stands to weason that cowows awe nothing but the modes by which we pewceive the wowwd in cewtain wespects. If this be twue, it wouwd seem to fowwow that cowows awe not pwopewties we see but onwy pwopewties by which we see. Ow in youw wowds:

No one sees cowow hewe [ow ewsewhewe, fow that mattew]

Sauce

Look, mom, I'm famous!